Re: [yang-doctors] Review of draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-13

"Acee Lindem (acee)" <acee@cisco.com> Mon, 20 February 2017 12:53 UTC

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From: "Acee Lindem (acee)" <acee@cisco.com>
To: Ladislav Lhotka <lhotka@nic.cz>, "yang-doctors@ietf.org" <yang-doctors@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Review of draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-13
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Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2017 12:53:04 +0000
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Subject: Re: [yang-doctors] Review of draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-13
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Hi Lada, 
I believe we¹ve addressed all of these other than adding an explicit leaf
for key direction (which was discussed on the RTGWG list). The current
version is https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-15.txt

Thanks,
Acee 

On 2/20/17, 6:49 AM, "Ladislav Lhotka" <lhotka@nic.cz> wrote:

>Reviewer: Ladislav Lhotka
>Review result: Almost Ready
>
># General Comments
>
>## Cryptographic algorithm types
>
>What is the reason for representing these as a YANG choice with empty
>leaves? I think it would be more natural to use a single leaf, either
>an enumeration or (if extensibility is important) identityref.
>
>## Reusability
>
>The module defines key-chain as a grouping with the aim of making it
>reusable in other modules. However, this approach has known problems
>that are discussed in draft-ietf-netmod-schema-mount. I am not sure
>how relevant they are in this case but, for one, the "key-chain-ref"
>type is not applicable if the "key-chain" grouping is used in another
>module. An alternative is not to use the grouping and rely on schema
>mount.
>
>## Key string style
>
>The difference between ASCII and hexadecimal formats of key strings
>should be explained. I understand that the latter is a hash of the key
>and, if so, I'd suggest to include "hexadecimal-string" also in state
>data.
>
>Also, I believe that storing clear-text key in configuration is
>insecure and Security Considerations should warn against it.
>
>## Example
>
>It might be useful to include an appendix with example instance data.
>
># Specific comments
>  
>## Sec. 2
>
>-   paragraph 2: s/where ever/wherever/
>
>## Sec. 3
>
>-   paragraph 1: replace both Key-Id a Key-ID with Key ID (the latter
>is used in other places of the
>    text).
>-   paragraph 2: the suggested way of supporting asymmetric keys looks
>like a hack, I would suggest
>    a more explicit representation, e.g. using a choice.
>
>## Sec. 4
>
>-   The module has inconsistent indentation: up to "grouping
>crypto-algorithm-types", top-level
>    statements are indented with four spaces, the subsequent ones with
>five spaces.
>
>## Sec. 6
>
>-   The statement "Given that the key chains themselves are sensitive
>data, it is RECOMMENDED
>    that the NETCONF communication channel be encrypted." is
>misleading because RFC 6241
>    requires that transport protocols for NETCONF guarantee
>confidentiality (and RFC 8040 does the
>    same for RESTCONF).
>
>