Subject
From
Date
List
Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?
Jay R. Ashworth
2008-08-11
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/uR_uycPTOQir3I-xLMpATnllpXs/
359562
1129551
Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?
bert hubert
2008-08-11
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/SbJnRBKMRfp9o8vb8bgrEzK8NdA/
359565
1129551
Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?
Olafur Gudmundsson
2008-08-12
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/f3f-leg_A1E4b_H2w9Q5UHd4cis/
359569
1129551
Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?
Paul Vixie
2008-08-12
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/Jz1Cm5QicFivuLEP16Yk_oWtU64/
359584
1129551
RE: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?RE: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?
Antoin Verschuren
2008-08-12
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/JN3PLpcnb8N8pJQVfEvsoAhpfm0/
359571
1129551
Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]
Peter Koch
2008-08-12
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/aJ0_GylJqDBlp2j8PhVJpkPcTX0/
359572
1129551
Re: Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]Re: Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]
Tony Finch
2008-08-12
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/iUvbHtJd9CE1E47QH_1ygcn-jr4/
359573
1129551
Re: Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]Re: Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]
Florian Weimer
2008-08-12
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/mj6BAnOMaxcC3qPmnbEs6c_rY_Q/
359583
1129551
Re: Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]Re: Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]
Tony Finch
2008-08-13
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/mBies4b9sVpe15RDkKSSCI6qtGc/
359593
1129551
Re: Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]Re: Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]
Peter Koch
2008-08-12
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/rdhCUHeUR2q-0TOgHkWANCrvYv0/
359585
1129551
DNSEXT/namedroppers list policyDNSEXT/namedroppers list policy
Ólafur Guðmundsson /DNSEXT chair
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/KYB2J5T4BASDLQCA-FPSrkP4IqM/
359533
1129552
majordomo is brokenmajordomo is broken
Mark_Andrews
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/dBqZOHY_OpRUTnP4RRUGaXfXtPY/
359532
1129553
first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reportedfirst succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reported
bert hubert
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/g-tFKqjkiUxycNQnSgUqHd9kWEM/
359528
1129554
Re: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reportedRe: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reported
sthaug
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/Dhp4UK0-0qv8AhJc7yA6S-WXbsQ/
359529
1129554
Re: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reportedRe: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reported
Jeroen Massar
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/sIj-MNkWMx-X7EChqlYzT4cOYoc/
359530
1129554
Re: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reportedRe: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reported
Ondřej Surý
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/B7MkPKAMkwaJkY5mxWvJO3zBMrw/
359534
1129554
Re: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reportedRe: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reported
Jeroen Massar
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/TBvYw30Rj7Bj2Pb5_MU2hVafWVw/
359536
1129554
Re: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reportedRe: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reported
sthaug
2008-08-10
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/KjxL7NXo4r-nos0Jqh_LgtC8XgM/
359545
1129554
Re: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reportedRe: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reported
Alex Bligh
2008-08-10
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/9nZKOm4Gn1XcNuK8gwARX-6HQYg/
359547
1129554
Re: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reportedRe: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reported
Paul Vixie
2008-08-10
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/vD-y5j_AbpzhVstcHs6VtbPAgYA/
359559
1129554
The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Duane
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/u0F4aCsPjq_f7qVhNy5RE4mLECw/
359494
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
David Ulevitch
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/2nseOuQlqRwMbe3Cb7k9zQYO0CM/
359496
1129556
Re: list policiesRe: list policies
Duane at e164 dot org
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/YYSjTqnMb7l_g-5VL64hmgfI97o/
359499
1129556
Re: list policiesRe: list policies
bmanning
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/uUAL0Ki0Z-ddaiHrykmtyT0WW4U/
359538
1129556
Re: list policiesRe: list policies
Duane at e164 dot org
2008-08-09
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/LmHXjEwMYp6bK7d61x-KihvEplM/
359540
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Duane at e164 dot org
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/NLZq2uDeOtn9UhQn_6w2rGb9KI8/
359513
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Ondřej Surý
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/4ePGMVEKlRSWgf3RICsYsyiLvzM/
359514
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Duane at e164 dot org
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/sjo4G7RGudPyTUpts0RRnCrfDJg/
359515
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Ondřej Surý
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/go9D-Q9cTJJZqlMlMj7ckDlhLXk/
359517
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Duane at e164 dot org
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/wnTa95owAjDy4bHZA-De09JR6Xs/
359518
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Ondřej Surý
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/DNB7f6hNS2bdxWMglsG1fhOGrck/
359521
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Duane at e164 dot org
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/TOSEhdqqOuQZPnT1rHj5uWhW7_g/
359522
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Olaf Kolkman
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/QHji64UvEL-ccBK_sE0K-6sRKcA/
359524
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Stefan Schmidt
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/LkWb3uvyM6S7wiXPGBpUm_MsnlY/
359525
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Duane at e164 dot org
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/U2lyt8EeCCGDBKu-ngnS7dfV2kU/
359527
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Ondřej Surý
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/sb4nSYwPIaa7uWos5KCVX7e9zc4/
359531
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Ralf Weber
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/Pls9PTCmZVcBfgl3qrwQJFIxYlQ/
359526
1129556
Additional filtering of responsesAdditional filtering of responses
Wouter Wijngaards
2008-08-07
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/XWQ5cy3583SKUj3AFx-AildcH_A/
359449
1129557
OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving DNSOFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving DNS
bert hubert
2008-08-07
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/TyOx4oRPOXg93i04R9Cn6TJxv_Q/
359450
1129557
Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving DNSRe: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving DNS
Duane
2008-08-07
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/3hxfy1Lq1GZfc21QxyAWrrChLUA/
359451
1129557