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Re: [abfab] I-D Action: draft-linus-abfab-ephemeral-keying-00.txt

"Klaas Wierenga (kwiereng)" <kwiereng@cisco.com> Fri, 21 February 2014 12:36 UTC

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From: "Klaas Wierenga (kwiereng)" <kwiereng@cisco.com>
To: Linus Nordberg <linus@nordberg.se>
Thread-Topic: [abfab] I-D Action: draft-linus-abfab-ephemeral-keying-00.txt
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Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 12:36:04 +0000
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Subject: Re: [abfab] I-D Action: draft-linus-abfab-ephemeral-keying-00.txt
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On Feb 17, 2014, at 11:11 PM, Linus Nordberg <linus@nordberg.se> wrote:

> Hi,
> 
> This is a somewhat incomplete draft of how the the client <--> RP
> traffic could be protected. Comments highly appreciated. Hoping to be
> able to have some discussions about this in London.

and hopefully before that on the list….

Klaas



> 
> 
> From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Subject: I-D Action: draft-linus-abfab-ephemeral-keying-00.txt
> Date: February 14, 2014 9:28:56 PM GMT+01:00
> To: <i-d-announce@ietf.org>
> Reply-To: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> 
> 
> 
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
> 
> 
>        Title           : Ephemeral keying for ABFAB
>        Authors         : Linus Nordberg
>                          Josh Howlett
> 	Filename        : draft-linus-abfab-ephemeral-keying-00.txt
> 	Pages           : 13
> 	Date            : 2014-02-14
> 
> Abstract:
>   This document describes how EAP-GSS provides forward secrecy by
>   encrypting each session in an ephemeral key generated in the initial
>   state of the context establishment.  This Diffie-Hellman key is
>   shared by the initiator (EAP peer) and acceptor (EAP authenticator).
> 
>   The goal is to stop a passive attacker with access to the traffic
>   between an ABFAB user and the service she uses (Relying Party), from
>   getting access to key material and information linkable to the user
>   or from being able to fingerprint the user.
> 
> 
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-linus-abfab-ephemeral-keying/
> 
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-linus-abfab-ephemeral-keying-00
> 
> 
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
> 
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
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> abfab@ietf.org
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