[abfab] I-D Action: draft-linus-abfab-ephemeral-keying-00.txt

Linus Nordberg <linus@nordberg.se> Mon, 17 February 2014 22:12 UTC

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From: Linus Nordberg <linus@nordberg.se>
To: abfab@ietf.org
Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2014 22:11:59 +0000
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Subject: [abfab] I-D Action: draft-linus-abfab-ephemeral-keying-00.txt
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Hi,

This is a somewhat incomplete draft of how the the client <--> RP
traffic could be protected. Comments highly appreciated. Hoping to be
able to have some discussions about this in London.

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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.


        Title           : Ephemeral keying for ABFAB
        Authors         : Linus Nordberg
                          Josh Howlett
	Filename        : draft-linus-abfab-ephemeral-keying-00.txt
	Pages           : 13
	Date            : 2014-02-14

Abstract:
   This document describes how EAP-GSS provides forward secrecy by
   encrypting each session in an ephemeral key generated in the initial
   state of the context establishment.  This Diffie-Hellman key is
   shared by the initiator (EAP peer) and acceptor (EAP authenticator).

   The goal is to stop a passive attacker with access to the traffic
   between an ABFAB user and the service she uses (Relying Party), from
   getting access to key material and information linkable to the user
   or from being able to fingerprint the user.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-linus-abfab-ephemeral-keying/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-linus-abfab-ephemeral-keying-00


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

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