Re: [Ace] EDHOC standardization

John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com> Thu, 22 November 2018 12:23 UTC

Return-Path: <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
X-Original-To: ace@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ace@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F423912D4E8 for <ace@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 22 Nov 2018 04:23:31 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -5.76
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.76 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-1.46, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=ericsson.com header.b=C74OiP4A; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=ericsson.com header.b=BC7ZmLZV
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 18rRpme-GrGj for <ace@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 22 Nov 2018 04:23:26 -0800 (PST)
Received: from sessmg23.ericsson.net (sessmg23.ericsson.net [193.180.251.45]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CE988129AB8 for <ace@ietf.org>; Thu, 22 Nov 2018 04:23:25 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=ericsson.com; s=mailgw201801; c=relaxed/simple; q=dns/txt; i=@ericsson.com; t=1542889404; x=1545481404; h=From:Sender:Reply-To:Subject:Date:Message-ID:To:CC:MIME-Version:Content-Type: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date:Resent-From: Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References:List-Id: List-Help:List-Unsubscribe:List-Subscribe:List-Post:List-Owner:List-Archive; bh=8bFBw7s6zNbkf1l/P0aO5ek83tOvjQa5GBDwFkyD540=; b=C74OiP4AW0ACqWq2wS0hRHy8IaE2p5CcKOmxQGJQtLr1F31enffU1A2HXCjbWCEk BvYYYFtP3UaPMIOrEN9MCUTizUpmVge+V2Jns9aglLz9X/SCddqDxCQfUAMwgfAN B96wL0k2V3Wi7Zp/dMxBjPYi3qzsTFfabE1XjUdWU3o=;
X-AuditID: c1b4fb2d-f61ff70000007af1-f2-5bf69fbb6cca
Received: from ESESSMB504.ericsson.se (Unknown_Domain [153.88.183.122]) by sessmg23.ericsson.net (Symantec Mail Security) with SMTP id D2.B0.31473.BBF96FB5; Thu, 22 Nov 2018 13:23:24 +0100 (CET)
Received: from ESESSMR505.ericsson.se (153.88.183.127) by ESESSMB504.ericsson.se (153.88.183.122) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256_P256) id 15.1.1466.3; Thu, 22 Nov 2018 13:23:23 +0100
Received: from ESESSMB505.ericsson.se (153.88.183.166) by ESESSMR505.ericsson.se (153.88.183.127) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256_P256) id 15.1.1466.3; Thu, 22 Nov 2018 13:23:23 +0100
Received: from EUR01-VE1-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (153.88.183.157) by ESESSMB505.ericsson.se (153.88.183.166) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256_P256) id 15.1.1466.3 via Frontend Transport; Thu, 22 Nov 2018 13:23:23 +0100
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ericsson.com; s=selector1; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck; bh=8bFBw7s6zNbkf1l/P0aO5ek83tOvjQa5GBDwFkyD540=; b=BC7ZmLZVwuk82ID832y80TOPyrMs6QfV6esEM5uuPrvewsB9lntzfHAdZMib3SMK/VOglBX7xuds58e25LK7o+vShM7jiOC+SI34bgVZVspzbCDd5ah5DTaoLnRVaQ3DBtOvLKDpPgpVy7VsQINCL1lo30WbQaa+NtnfDeqsMkQ=
Received: from HE1PR07MB4169.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com (20.176.166.22) by HE1PR07MB4396.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com (20.176.167.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.20.1361.11; Thu, 22 Nov 2018 12:23:21 +0000
Received: from HE1PR07MB4169.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::18ff:fb34:36ea:bd64]) by HE1PR07MB4169.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::18ff:fb34:36ea:bd64%4]) with mapi id 15.20.1361.016; Thu, 22 Nov 2018 12:23:21 +0000
From: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>, "ace@ietf.org" <ace@ietf.org>, "lwip@ietf.org" <lwip@ietf.org>
CC: 'Benjamin Kaduk' <kaduk@mit.edu>, "salvador.p.f@um.es" <salvador.p.f@um.es>
Thread-Topic: [Ace] EDHOC standardization
Thread-Index: AQHUcrwmx6N1o4AsH0uz6RMW3Bvpj6U+JgWAgBxb0gD///VbAIABcGgA
Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2018 12:23:21 +0000
Message-ID: <B119A1D8-08B5-431E-BB16-35D84AA6F6CB@ericsson.com>
References: <C79F1336-A297-4E64-AB32-2F5D474A200E@ericsson.com> <20181103145857.GG54966@kduck.kaduk.org> <7F78CC92-5C48-4BFC-8087-E25D4D95A74F@ericsson.com> <000001d481ae$57cd4530$0767cf90$@augustcellars.com>
In-Reply-To: <000001d481ae$57cd4530$0767cf90$@augustcellars.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/10.11.0.180909
x-originating-ip: [192.176.1.81]
x-ms-publictraffictype: Email
x-microsoft-exchange-diagnostics: 1; HE1PR07MB4396; 6:w6AnllJi/4HRjNDJiKMu46QVrdmXnE7Vft0j78Sdy9F5YOPZW4oH+bU5BMfsDphx1PuSeGmL/u8ZCDkGcDWcwau4Q/BXMsTICp3Cblzg4mKspZiKq0+MNNN2e+WTknatPglbC9GeRszZvChum/5EAZSy1LBTTgu8h73nWdb9WGtCTS5RiOiLKEjCzHpw9ieU8Cs+K4p4J8fSOVWTTd04Eq9IQC87g1wBSg4cDH+gnlmh9qaIdSnCJoYDd0xWhwAZZqM9gB6q0vMG4IQF2DOwIhjrbA8BmJVlmPbL9nDILvqhLxDVlZXWvF+iX076b4wPFQ1/X/+3mK8LZcp0t+dO4nkNiZawNdb8xWwfFySRZwcOTxGJlvyglewc8rhWnFV3nWQdTJUZmpIIdbeFCnCw0ic05XPpl00/I/ri6u4/YGAtyKS6g4ZajzajVDrdS10zBeYB2YuWFksrd8EGJ6aQdw==; 5:bcJEgUpHEpvSEPpyFD//38nDp+nQPakPgHlmkeAsDeX32EM9Q+N4kuJvDHL/fd0MRjs3fnVKJKT6yEwSaAzK7KRdCWWWBiMyiRCiKVSL7tXiffA3x6xcm1P+edPFSp8nadYdv80gvCZZQ70KKlIAumOM2ifYe7dPbS3A3nJaAx8=; 7:M5GvVNEdw70F1HLw+jfj0L9LuLP1NfXf9Wt/z3PShsaFDHPYwZtkjNyivezo9115iHSIxaFOE18mrafHyv2sX9DJ+aYLtnmN27gTFf15hWkahk/Rf/NzQa+ajaaiqAhw5BDtC7xDGLjky/fluSNDSg==
x-ms-exchange-antispam-srfa-diagnostics: SOS;
x-ms-office365-filtering-correlation-id: 465f1361-e998-44fc-e4d1-08d650754ae9
x-microsoft-antispam: BCL:0; PCL:0; RULEID:(2390098)(7020095)(4652040)(8989299)(5600074)(711020)(4534185)(4627221)(201703031133081)(201702281549075)(8990200)(2017052603328)(7153060)(7193020); SRVR:HE1PR07MB4396;
x-ms-traffictypediagnostic: HE1PR07MB4396:
authentication-results: spf=none (sender IP is ) smtp.mailfrom=john.mattsson@ericsson.com;
x-microsoft-antispam-prvs: <HE1PR07MB43963DC94D5EE9825A8235AB89DB0@HE1PR07MB4396.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com>
x-ms-exchange-senderadcheck: 1
x-exchange-antispam-report-cfa-test: BCL:0; PCL:0; RULEID:(8211001083)(6040522)(2401047)(5005006)(8121501046)(93006095)(93001095)(3231442)(944501410)(52105112)(3002001)(10201501046)(148016)(149066)(150057)(6041310)(201703131423095)(201702281528075)(20161123555045)(201703061421075)(201703061406153)(20161123562045)(20161123560045)(20161123558120)(20161123564045)(201708071742011)(7699051)(76991095); SRVR:HE1PR07MB4396; BCL:0; PCL:0; RULEID:; SRVR:HE1PR07MB4396;
x-forefront-prvs: 0864A36BBF
x-forefront-antispam-report: SFV:NSPM; SFS:(10009020)(396003)(136003)(366004)(39860400002)(346002)(376002)(53754006)(51914003)(199004)(189003)(13464003)(82746002)(11346002)(6436002)(446003)(2900100001)(186003)(476003)(2616005)(3846002)(6116002)(97736004)(6512007)(6306002)(26005)(14454004)(486006)(83716004)(105586002)(71190400001)(6506007)(6486002)(53546011)(53936002)(102836004)(14444005)(6246003)(44832011)(4326008)(36756003)(76176011)(106356001)(53946003)(256004)(2906002)(58126008)(229853002)(966005)(25786009)(66066001)(68736007)(2201001)(4744004)(316002)(99286004)(478600001)(81156014)(71200400001)(110136005)(54906003)(7736002)(86362001)(81166006)(2501003)(8936002)(33656002)(305945005)(93886005)(5660300001)(8676002)(559001)(579004); DIR:OUT; SFP:1101; SCL:1; SRVR:HE1PR07MB4396; H:HE1PR07MB4169.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com; FPR:; SPF:None; LANG:en; PTR:InfoNoRecords; A:1; MX:1;
received-spf: None (protection.outlook.com: ericsson.com does not designate permitted sender hosts)
x-microsoft-antispam-message-info: nUxK+VN4M4qxWJt5SiXC26K8T1SuS26Vpm7GCb2aFq2v9Bggvk/kn6gwDNRZvXFseHWqmZMiL2tvQgc0s4IoCTXdZ3LH5yMx4I9snhfT6zWCIO/Bos5H31hD2mv5NekyBzcIC1wDfMy99odxajlDvo+fOeNkOtiOFGxElQW69zY91b+buzGPA+2IGzKqDO4AzJ8xl0REyBrKaELsT4dJTEpp6+FfSB+2IO7GZWSz3pISRjRLheNLsIB/pwmf5AznoEaiEG0Le9JO6gDvXJRwDAozoOwL7iWbY/G26hgj2EK0HyusWjeJ2ESdvjIP/VecwAhiPKHD9pcazxl9VqCTqeOJW3LyzT+xvtdAv1N9OzQ=
spamdiagnosticoutput: 1:99
spamdiagnosticmetadata: NSPM
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-ID: <05F42C19788F664EBDD6CE9A896CFC51@eurprd07.prod.outlook.com>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: 465f1361-e998-44fc-e4d1-08d650754ae9
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-originalarrivaltime: 22 Nov 2018 12:23:21.6491 (UTC)
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-fromentityheader: Hosted
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-id: 92e84ceb-fbfd-47ab-be52-080c6b87953f
X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: HE1PR07MB4396
X-OriginatorOrg: ericsson.com
X-Brightmail-Tracker: H4sIAAAAAAAAA02SbUhTYRTHe+69u5ur1c35cjIkXYQ18C0DJ0SpH2yBQVJJKFIjL26oU3bV UvxgLsumgfmSm6RbOjRnkEaS5FK0DJ2vpYkpkS8Tm5YYxiTMaNtd0bffOed/zv+ch4eHe5o4 fjyFModWKWUZIpJP6C6/KAg26+3JYYNaTLJlL8clbbVbpKSlQ4dJGnqEErXpAzeaI+14WEtK jcafmLR4ZACXjtluE+eJJP7JVDpDkUerQk9d5cu77cVY9sxr7IbF2swtQu3dmAZ58IA6ATpL I+5kT+oNgk2djwbxHWxH8K25lvwXDI9WIVZlxGB0NdHJBFWBg6ZVzoqqMDC/ayXYYBHBaFOn y4OkwqDeXEQ62YtSwNjEHa6TcSoBurZXOU4WUkehQ9PJZTXHoObLd4zlOFie2cFYtyNQWb/s 2kJAnYaeFQuXNZtG0K4ecjV7UNHwYGrONRRRPrBleYKxZr4wa9W7j6bAaB7HWfYG29Jvl96b CgX9fCmHzQfAW63zGif7w3t9GXKaATVNgkHT6xYFw0ZNjXvQOWhYKcdZ0QSCqc8/HCKeIxDD wqcgdqEUKCmpdfemw/3KTVSBIur+26/O0YE7HuDpy1A2LQXbr36S5UCoLlvg1rnu3w9DOith QBwT8mZohslMOx4RQqsU1xgmSxmipHOeIccP6nu+HdyF2tZi+hHFQ6I9gt679mRPjiyPyc/s R8DDRV6CyRhHSpAqyy+gVVlXVLkZNNOPDvIIka8gxGRO8qTSZDl0Ok1n06q/VYzn4VeE+AGR DaWNBjGjmSv0H1wcbloTr2ecjUqq11YQA+E28XhD18VLG7Ft8caU2F2mV/Rq4U6qLVE9Wy2J OhA3sBEZv8/aggo/JkyFXlgPfOQ1PhIX2Kffzf0qr8wNOiScuNk3Wemr3TuvFj6OEGg6OTvG 9utJS2cmyHtig+GWFTssIhi5LFyMqxjZH82CuTc9AwAA
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ace/TZ50r_dM2nCVM9kRENmU7n0ygmg>
Subject: Re: [Ace] EDHOC standardization
X-BeenThere: ace@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments \(ace\)" <ace.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ace>, <mailto:ace-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ace/>
List-Post: <mailto:ace@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ace-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ace>, <mailto:ace-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2018 12:23:32 -0000

Hi Jim,

> In the analysis that I did I very deliberately used TLS not DTLS.  The main reason for using DTLS is because one is operating in the UDP environment and one cannot have reliable in order delivery.  Since EDHOC is being built on top of CoAP, one can use CoAP to create reliable in order delivery.  Thus, the extra bytes that DTLS has to deal with this are not needed.

I started with DTLS as that was what was discussion between Salvador and Benjamin. Below are numbers for TLS 1.3. Changes compared to DTLS 1.3 are that the record header is smaller, handshake headers are smaller, and that Connection ID is not supported in TLS 1.3. The numbers I get for TLS 1.3 are overall slightly bigger than the numbers in your estimate (but for PSK Flight #3 I get slightly smaller numbers). I think the difference is due to many smaller things like handshake headers and fields in the certificate structure that adds up. I plan to add TLS 1.3 numbers to draft-ietf-lwig-security-protocol-comparison as well.

I agree with your comment Jim. Just now, I am just trying to count the number of bytes of the security protocol. To do a fair comparison, you have to choose a specific deployment and look at the topology, the whole protocol stack, frame sizes (e.g. 128 bytes), how and where in the protocol stack fragmentation is done, and the expected packet loss. There is ongoing work on such simulations for 6tisch. Fragmentation and/or packet loss lead to the total number of bytes in the table below has to be multiplied by some linear factor. And as more bytes often lead to increased packet loss, you often see a non-linear relation between logical number of bytes on the transport/application layer as shown in the table below and physical number of bytes and/or time from completion of the protocol. Any realistic comparison over constrained radio would make the difference between TLS 1.3 and EDHOC larger. A problem with TLS is that it does not support Connection ID.

TLS Assumptions:
- Minimum number of algorithms and cipher suites offered 
- Curve25519, ECDSA with P-256, AES-CCM_8, SHA-256
- Length of key identifiers: 4 bytes
- TLS RPK with point compression (saves 32 bytes)
- Only mandatory TLS extentions

==============================================================================
Flight                                #1         #2        #3       Total     
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DTLS 1.3 RPK + ECDHE                 143        364       212        721      
TLS 1.3  RPK + ECDHE                 129        322       194        645      
EDHOC    RPK + ECDHE                  37        120        85        242      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DTLS 1.3 PSK + ECDHE                 180        183        56        419      
TLS 1.3  PSK + ECDHE                 166        157        50        373      
EDHOC    PSK + ECDHE                  42         46        11         99      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DTLS 1.3 PSK                         130        143        56        329      
TLS 1.3  PSK                         116        117        50        283      
==============================================================================
                        Number of bytes (No connection ID)

Below is detailed information about the different flights:

======================================================
TLS 1.3 Flight #1 RPK + ECDHE
======================================================

Record Header - TLSPlaintext (5 bytes)
16 03 03 LL LL

	Handshake Header - Client Hello (4 bytes)
	01 LL LL LL

		Legacy Version (2 bytes)
		03 03

		Client Random (32 bytes)
		00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f

		Legacy Session ID (1 bytes)
		00

		Cipher Suites (TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256) (4 bytes)
		00 02 13 05

		Compression Methods (null) (2 bytes)
		01 00

		Extensions Length (2 bytes)
		LL LL

			Extension - Supported Groups (x25519) (8 bytes)
			00 0a 00 04 00 02 00 1d

			Extension - Signature Algorithms (ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256) (8 bytes)
			00 0d 00 04 00 02 08 07

			Extension - Key Share (42 bytes)
			00 33 00 26 00 24 00 1d 00 20
			00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f

			Extension - Supported Versions (1.3) (7 bytes)
			00 2b 00 03 02 03 04 

			Extension - Client Certificate Type (Raw Public Key) (6 bytes)
			00 13 00 01 01 02 

			Extension - Server Certificate Type (Raw Public Key) (6 bytes)
			00 14 00 01 01 02

5 + 4 + 2 + 32 + 1 + 4 + 2 + 2 + 8 + 8 + 42 + 7 + 6 + 6 = 129 bytes

------------------------------------------------------
TLS 1.3 Flight #1 PSK + ECDHE
------------------------------------------------------

Differences compared to RPK + ECDHE

+ Extension - PSK Key Exchange Modes (6 bytes)
  00 2d 00 02 01 01

+ Extension - Pre Shared Key (51 bytes)
  00 29 00 2F
  00 0a 00 04 ID ID ID ID 00 00 00 00
  00 21 20 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f

- Extension - Signature Algorithms (ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256) (8 bytes)

- Extension - Client Certificate Type (Raw Public Key) (6 bytes)

- Extension - Server Certificate Type (Raw Public Key) (6 bytes)

129 + 6 + 51 - 8 - 6 - 6 = 166 bytes

------------------------------------------------------
TLS 1.3 Flight #1 PSK
------------------------------------------------------

Differences compared to PSK + ECDHE

- Extension - Supported Groups (x25519) (8 bytes)

- Extension - Key Share (42 bytes)

166 - 8 - 42 = 116 bytes



======================================================
TLS 1.3 Flight #2  RPK + ECDHE
======================================================

Record Header - TLSPlaintext (5 bytes)
16 03 03 LL LL

	Handshake Header - Server Hello (4 bytes)
	02 LL LL LL

		Legacy Version (2 bytes)
		fe fd

		Server Random (32 bytes)
		00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f

		Legacy Session ID (1 bytes)
		00

		Cipher Suite (TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256) (2 bytes)
		13 05

		Compression Method (null) (1 bytes)
		00

		Extensions Length (2 bytes)
		LL LL

			Extension - Key Share (40 bytes)
			00 33 00 24 00 1d 00 20
			00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f

			Extension - Supported Versions (1.3) (6 bytes)
			00 2b 00 02 03 04

Record Header - TLSCiphertext (5 bytes)
17 03 03 LL LL

	Handshake Header - Encrypted Extensions (4 bytes)
	08 LL LL LL

		Extensions Length (2 bytes)
		LL LL

			Extension - Client Certificate Type (Raw Public Key) (6 bytes)
			00 13 00 01 01 02 

			Extension - Server Certificate Type (Raw Public Key) (6 bytes)
			00 14 00 01 01 02

	Handshake Header - Certificate Request (4 bytes)
	0d LL LL LL

		Request Context (1 bytes)
		00

		Extensions Length (2 bytes)
		LL LL

			Extension - Signature Algorithms (ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256) (8 bytes)
			00 0d 00 04 00 02 08 07

	Handshake Header - Certificate (4 bytes)
	0b LL LL LL

		Request Context (1 bytes)
		00

		Certificate List Length (3 bytes)
		LL LL LL

		Certificate Length (3 bytes)
		LL LL LL

		Certificate (59 bytes) // Point compression
		....

		Certificate Extensions (2 bytes)
		00 00

	Handshake Header - Certificate Verify (4 bytes)
	0f LL LL LL

		Signature  (68 bytes)
		ZZ ZZ 00 40 ....

	Handshake Header - Finished (4 bytes)
	14 LL LL LL

		Verify Data (32 bytes)
		00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f

	Record Type (1 byte)
	16

Auth Tag (8 bytes)
e0 8b 0e 45 5a 35 0a e5

5 + 90 + 5 + 18 + 15 + 72 + 72 + 36 + 1 + 8 = 322 bytes

------------------------------------------------------
TLS 1.3 Flight #2 PSK + ECDHE
------------------------------------------------------

Differences compared to RPK + ECDHE

- Handshake Message Certificate (72 bytes)

- Handshake Message CertificateVerify (72 bytes)

- Handshake Message CertificateRequest (15 bytes)

- Extension - Client Certificate Type (Raw Public Key) (6 bytes)

- Extension - Server Certificate Type (Raw Public Key) (6 bytes)

+ Extension - Pre Shared Key (6 bytes)
  00 29 00 02 00 00

322 - 72 - 72 - 15 - 6 - 6  + 6 = 157 bytes

------------------------------------------------------
TLS 1.3 Flight #2 PSK
------------------------------------------------------

Differences compared to PSK + ECDHE

- Extension - Key Share (40 bytes)

157 - 40 = 117 bytes



======================================================
TLS 1.3 Flight #3 RPK + ECDHE
======================================================

Record Header - TLSCiphertext (5 bytes)
17 03 03 LL LL

	Handshake Header - Certificate (4 bytes)
	0b LL LL LL

		Request Context (1 bytes)
		00

		Certificate List Length (3 bytes)
		LL LL LL

		Certificate Length (3 bytes)
		LL LL LL
	
		Certificate (59 bytes) // Point compression
		....

		Certificate Extensions (2 bytes)
		00 00

	Handshake Header - Certificate Verify (4 bytes) 
	0f LL LL LL

		Signature  (68 bytes)
		04 03 LL LL //ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
		00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
		00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f

	Handshake Header - Finished (4 bytes)
	14 LL LL LL

		Verify Data (32 bytes) // SHA-256
		00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f

	Record Type (1 byte)
	16

Auth Tag (8 bytes) // AES-CCM_8
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07

5 + 72 + 72 + 36 + 1 + 8 = 194 bytes

------------------------------------------------------
TLS 1.3 Flight #3 PSK + ECDHE
-----------------------------------------------------

Differences compared to RPK + ECDHE

- Handshake Message Certificate (72 bytes)

- Handshake Message Certificate Verify (72 bytes)

194 - 72 - 72 = 50 bytes

------------------------------------------------------
TLS 1.3 Flight #3 PSK
-----------------------------------------------------

Differences compared to PSK + ECDHE

None

50 bytes


-----Original Message-----
From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
Date: Wednesday, 21 November 2018 at 16:25
To: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>om>, "ace@ietf.org" <ace@ietf.org>rg>, "lwip@ietf.org" <lwip@ietf.org>
Cc: 'Benjamin Kaduk' <kaduk@mit.edu>du>, "salvador.p.f@um.es" <salvador.p.f@um.es>
Subject: RE: [Ace] EDHOC standardization

John,

In the analysis that I did I very deliberately used TLS not DTLS.  The main reason for using DTLS is because one is operating in the UDP environment and one cannot have reliable in order delivery.  Since EDHOC is being built on top of CoAP, one can use CoAP to create reliable in order delivery.  Thus the extra bytes that DTLS has to deal with this are not needed.

Jim


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ace <ace-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of John Mattsson
> Sent: Wednesday, November 21, 2018 7:03 AM
> To: ace@ietf.org; lwip@ietf.org
> Cc: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>du>; salvador.p.f@um.es
> Subject: Re: [Ace] EDHOC standardization
> 
> Hi all,
> 
> Inspired by the discussion in this thread, I did more detailed calculations of the
> number of bytes when DTLS 1.3 is used for typical IoT use cases (PSK, RPK,
> Connection ID). The plan is to add this information to draft-ietf-lwig-security-
> protocol-comparison as this has been requested by several people. I think some
> bytes were missing in the earlier estimates for TLS 1.3, and as Ben commented,
> DTLS 1.3 adds some bytes compared to TLS 1.3.
> 
> ================================================================
> ==============
> Flight                                #1         #2        #3       Total
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> DTLS 1.3 RPK + ECDHE                 149        373       213        735
> DTLS 1.3 PSK + ECDHE                 186        190        57        433
> DTLS 1.3 PSK                         136        150        57        343
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> EDHOC    RPK + ECDHE                  38        121        86        245
> EDHOC    PSK + ECDHE                  43         47        12        102
> ================================================================
> ==============
>                                  Number of bytes
> 
> Assumptions:
> - Minimum number of algorithms and cipher suites offered
> - Curve25519, ECDSA with P-256, AES-CCM_8, SHA-256
> - Length of key identifiers: 4 bytes
> - Connection identifiers: 1 byte
> - The DTLS RPKs use point compression (saves 32 bytes)
> - No DTLS handshake message fragmentation
> - Only mandatory DTLS extentions, except for connection ID
> - Version 30 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-30
> 
> (EDHOC numbers are for the soon to be published -11 version with cipher
> suites)
> 
> I hope this information is useful for people. Please comment if I missed
> something or if you have any suggestion of things to add or how to present
> things. I do not know currently how these numbers compare to DTLS 1.2.
> 
> Below is detailed information about where the byte in different flights as well
> as the RPKs (SubjectPublicKeyInfo). Most of the bytes should have the correct
> value, but most of the length fields are just written as LL LL LL. Below is also
> information about how resumption, cached information [RFC 7924], and not
> using Connection ID affects the number of bytes.
> 
> 
> ======================================================
> DTLS 1.3 Flight #1 RPK + ECDHE
> ======================================================
> 
> Record Header - DTLSPlaintext (13 bytes)
> 16 fe fd EE EE SS SS SS SS SS SS LL LL
> 
> 	Handshake Header - Client Hello (10 bytes)
> 	01 LL LL LL SS SS 00 00 00 LL LL LL
> 
> 		Legacy Version (2 bytes)
> 		fe fd
> 
> 		Client Random (32 bytes)
> 		00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14
> 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
> 
> 		Legacy Session ID (1 bytes)
> 		00
> 
> 		Cipher Suites (TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256) (4 bytes)
> 		00 02 13 05
> 
> 		Compression Methods (null) (2 bytes)
> 		01 00
> 
> 		Extensions Length (2 bytes)
> 		LL LL
> 
> 			Extension - Supported Groups (x25519) (8 bytes)
> 			00 0a 00 04 00 02 00 1d
> 
> 			Extension - Signature Algorithms
> (ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256) (8 bytes)
> 			00 0d 00 04 00 02 08 07
> 
> 			Extension - Key Share (42 bytes)
> 			00 33 00 26 00 24 00 1d 00 20
> 			00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11
> 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
> 
> 			Extension - Supported Versions (1.3) (7 bytes)
> 			00 2b 00 03 02 03 04
> 
> 			Extension - Client Certificate Type (Raw Public Key) (6
> bytes)
> 			00 13 00 01 01 02
> 
> 			Extension - Server Certificate Type (Raw Public Key) (6
> bytes)
> 			00 14 00 01 01 02
> 
> 			Extension - Connection Identifier (43) (6 bytes)
> 			XX XX 00 02 01 42
> 
> 13 + 10 + 2 + 32 + 1 + 4 + 2 + 2 + 8 + 8 + 42 + 7 + 6 + 6 + 6 = 149 bytes
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------
> DTLS 1.3 Flight #1 PSK + ECDHE
> ------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Differences compared to RPK + ECDHE
> 
> + Extension - PSK Key Exchange Modes (6 bytes)
>   00 2d 00 02 01 01
> 
> + Extension - Pre Shared Key (51 bytes)
>   00 29 00 2F
>   00 0a 00 04 ID ID ID ID 00 00 00 00
>   00 21 20 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15
> 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
> 
> - Extension - Signature Algorithms (ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256) (8 bytes)
> 
> - Extension - Client Certificate Type (Raw Public Key) (6 bytes)
> 
> - Extension - Server Certificate Type (Raw Public Key) (6 bytes)
> 
> 149 + 6 + 51 - 8 - 6 - 6 = 186 bytes
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------
> DTLS 1.3 Flight #1 PSK
> ------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Differences compared to PSK + ECDHE
> 
> - Extension - Supported Groups (x25519) (8 bytes)
> 
> - Extension - Key Share (42 bytes)
> 
> 186 - 8 - 42 = 136 bytes
> 
> 
> 
> ======================================================
> DTLS 1.3 Flight #2  RPK + ECDHE
> ======================================================
> 
> Record Header - DTLSPlaintext (13 bytes)
> 16 fe fd EE EE SS SS SS SS SS SS LL LL
> 
> 	Handshake Header - Server Hello (10 bytes)
> 	02 LL LL LL SS SS 00 00 00 LL LL LL
> 
> 		Legacy Version (2 bytes)
> 		fe fd
> 
> 		Server Random (32 bytes)
> 		00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14
> 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
> 
> 		Legacy Session ID (1 bytes)
> 		00
> 
> 		Cipher Suite (TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256) (2 bytes)
> 		13 05
> 
> 		Compression Method (null) (1 bytes)
> 		00
> 
> 		Extensions Length (2 bytes)
> 		LL LL
> 
> 			Extension - Key Share (40 bytes)
> 			00 33 00 24 00 1d 00 20
> 			00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11
> 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
> 
> 			Extension - Supported Versions (1.3) (6 bytes)
> 			00 2b 00 02 03 04
> 
> 			Extension - Connection Identifier (43) (6 bytes)
> 			XX XX 00 02 01 43
> 
> Record Header - DTLSCiphertext, Full (6 bytes) HH ES SS 43 LL LL
> 
> 	Handshake Header - Encrypted Extensions (10 bytes)
> 	08 LL LL LL SS SS 00 00 00 LL LL LL
> 
> 		Extensions Length (2 bytes)
> 		LL LL
> 
> 			Extension - Client Certificate Type (Raw Public Key) (6
> bytes)
> 			00 13 00 01 01 02
> 
> 			Extension - Server Certificate Type (Raw Public Key) (6
> bytes)
> 			00 14 00 01 01 02
> 
> 	Handshake Header - Certificate Request (10 bytes)
> 	0d LL LL LL SS SS 00 00 00 LL LL LL
> 
> 		Request Context (1 bytes)
> 		00
> 
> 		Extensions Length (2 bytes)
> 		LL LL
> 
> 			Extension - Signature Algorithms
> (ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256) (8 bytes)
> 			00 0d 00 04 00 02 08 07
> 
> 	Handshake Header - Certificate (10 bytes)
> 	0b LL LL LL SS SS 00 00 00 LL LL LL
> 
> 		Request Context (1 bytes)
> 		00
> 
> 		Certificate List Length (3 bytes)
> 		LL LL LL
> 
> 		Certificate Length (3 bytes)
> 		LL LL LL
> 
> 		Certificate (59 bytes) // Point compression
> 		....
> 
> 		Certificate Extensions (2 bytes)
> 		00 00
> 
> 	Handshake Header - Certificate Verify (10 bytes)
> 	0f LL LL LL SS SS 00 00 00 LL LL LL
> 
> 		Signature  (68 bytes)
> 		ZZ ZZ 00 40 ....
> 
> 	Handshake Header - Finished (10 bytes)
> 	14 LL LL LL SS SS 00 00 00 LL LL LL
> 
> 		Verify Data (32 bytes)
> 		00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14
> 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
> 
> 	Record Type (1 byte)
> 	16
> 
> Auth Tag (8 bytes)
> e0 8b 0e 45 5a 35 0a e5
> 
> 13 + 102 + 6 + 24 + 21 + 78 + 78 + 42 + 1 + 8 = 373 bytes
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------
> DTLS 1.3 Flight #2 PSK + ECDHE
> ------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Differences compared to RPK + ECDHE
> 
> - Handshake Message Certificate (78 bytes)
> 
> - Handshake Message CertificateVerify (78 bytes)
> 
> - Handshake Message CertificateRequest (21 bytes)
> 
> - Extension - Client Certificate Type (Raw Public Key) (6 bytes)
> 
> - Extension - Server Certificate Type (Raw Public Key) (6 bytes)
> 
> + Extension - Pre Shared Key (6 bytes)
>   00 29 00 02 00 00
> 
> 373 - 78 - 78 - 21 - 6 - 6  + 6 = 190 bytes
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------
> DTLS 1.3 Flight #2 PSK
> ------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Differences compared to PSK + ECDHE
> 
> - Extension - Key Share (40 bytes)
> 
> 190 - 40 = 150 bytes
> 
> 
> 
> ======================================================
> DTLS 1.3 Flight #3 RPK + ECDHE
> ======================================================
> 
> Record Header (6 bytes) // DTLSCiphertext, Full ZZ ES SS 42 LL LL
> 
> 	Handshake Header - Certificate (10 bytes)
> 	0b LL LL LL SS SS XX XX XX LL LL LL
> 
> 		Request Context (1 bytes)
> 		00
> 
> 		Certificate List Length (3 bytes)
> 		LL LL LL
> 
> 		Certificate Length (3 bytes)
> 		LL LL LL
> 
> 		Certificate (59 bytes) // Point compression
> 		....
> 
> 		Certificate Extensions (2 bytes)
> 		00 00
> 
> 	Handshake Header - Certificate Verify (10 bytes)
> 	0f LL LL LL SS SS 00 00 00 LL LL LL
> 
> 		Signature  (68 bytes)
> 		04 03 LL LL //ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
> 		00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14
> 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
> 		00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14
> 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
> 
> 	Handshake Header - Finished (10 bytes)
> 	14 LL LL LL SS SS 00 00 00 LL LL LL
> 
> 		Verify Data (32 bytes) // SHA-256
> 		00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14
> 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
> 
> 	Record Type (1 byte)
> 	16
> 
> Auth Tag (8 bytes) // AES-CCM_8
> 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
> 
> 6 + 78 + 78 + 42 + 1 + 8 = 213 bytes
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------
> DTLS 1.3 Flight #3 PSK + ECDHE
> -----------------------------------------------------
> 
> Differences compared to RPK + ECDHE
> 
> - Handshake Message Certificate (78 bytes)
> 
> - Handshake Message Certificate Verify (78 bytes)
> 
> 213 - 78 - 78 = 57 bytes
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------
> DTLS 1.3 Flight #3 PSK
> -----------------------------------------------------
> 
> Differences compared to PSK + ECDHE
> 
> None
> 
> 57 bytes
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ======================================================
> DTLS 1.3 - Cached information [RFC 7924]
> ======================================================
> 
> - Cached information together with server X.509 can be used to move bytes
> from flight #2 to flight #1
>   (cached RPK increases the number of bytes compared to cached X.509)
> 
> Differences compared to RPK + ECDHE
> 
> Flight #1
> 
> - Extension - Server Certificate Type (Raw Public Key) (6 bytes)
> 
> + Extension - Client Cashed Information (39 bytes)
>   00 19 LL LL LL LL
>   01 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
> 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
> 
> 149 + 33 = 182 bytes
> 
> Flight #2
> 
> - Extension - Server Certificate Type (Raw Public Key) (6 bytes)
> 
> + Extension - Server Cashed Information (7 bytes)
>   00 19 LL LL LL LL 01
> 
> - Server Certificate (59 bytes -> 32 bytes)
> 
> 373 - 26 = 347 bytes
> 
> ================================================================
> ==============
> Flight                                #1         #2        #3       Total
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> DTLS 1.3 Cached X.509/RPK + ECDHE    182        347       213        742
> DTLS 1.3 RPK + ECDHE                 149        373       213        735
> ================================================================
> ==============
> 
> 
> 
> ======================================================
> DTLS 1.3 - Resumption
> ======================================================
> 
> To enable resumption, a 4th flight (New Session Ticket) is added
> 
> Flight #4 - New Session Ticket
> 
> Record Header - DTLSCiphertext, Full (6 bytes) HH ES SS 43 LL LL
> 
> 	Handshake Header - New Session Ticket (10 bytes)
> 	04 LL LL LL SS SS 00 00 00 LL LL LL
> 
> 		Ticket Lifetime (4 bytes)
> 		00 01 02 03
> 
> 		Ticket Age Add (4 bytes)
> 		00 01 02 03
> 
> 		Ticket Nonce (2 bytes)
> 		01 00
> 
> 		Ticket (6 bytes)
> 		00 04 ID ID ID ID
> 
> 		Extensions (2 bytes)
> 		00 00
> 
> Auth Tag (8 bytes) // AES-CCM_8
> 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
> 
> 6 + 10 + 4 + 4 + 2 + 6 + 2 + 8 = 42 bytes
> 
> The resumption handshake is just a PSK handshake with 136 + 150 + 57 = 343
> bytes
> 
> ================================================================
> ==============
> Flight                                      #1     #2     #3     #4    Total
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> DTLS 1.3 RPK + ECDHE + NewSessionTicket    149    373    213     42      777
> DTLS 1.3 PSK (resumption)                  136    150     57             343
> ================================================================
> ==============
> 
> 
> 
> ======================================================
> DTLS 1.3 - Connection ID
> ======================================================
> 
> Without a Connection ID the DTLS 1.3 flight sizes changes as follows
> 
> DTLS 1.3 Flight #1:   -6 bytes
> DTLS 1.3 Flight #2:   -7 bytes
> DTLS 1.3 Flight #3:   -1 byte
> 
> 
> 
> ================================================================
> ==============
> Flight                                #1         #2        #3       Total
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> DTLS 1.3 RPK + ECDHE (no cid)        143        364       212        721
> DTLS 1.3 PSK + ECDHE (no cid)        180        183        56        419
> DTLS 1.3 PSK (no cid)                130        143        56        329
> ================================================================
> ==============
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ======================================================
> DTLS Raw Public Keys
> ======================================================
> 
> SubjectPublicKeyInfo without point compression
> -----------------------------------------------------
> 
> 0x30 // Sequence
> 0x59 // Size 89
> 
> 0x30 // Sequence
> 0x13 // Size 19
> 0x06 0x07 0x2A 0x86 0x48 0xCE 0x3D 0x02 0x01.     // OID 1.2.840.10045.2.1
> (ecPublicKey)
> 0x06 0x08 0x2A 0x86 0x48 0xCE 0x3D 0x03 0x01 0x07 // OID
> 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 (secp256r1)
> 
> 0x03 // Bit string
> 0x42 // Size 66
> 0x00 // Unused bits 0
> 0x04 // Uncompressed
> ...... 64 bytes X and Y
> 
> Total of 91 bytes
> 
> SubjectPublicKeyInfo with point compression
> -----------------------------------------------------
> 
> 0x30 // Sequence
> 0x59 // Size 89
> 
> 0x30 // Sequence
> 0x13 // Size 19
> 0x06 0x07 0x2A 0x86 0x48 0xCE 0x3D 0x02 0x01.     // OID 1.2.840.10045.2.1
> (ecPublicKey)
> 0x06 0x08 0x2A 0x86 0x48 0xCE 0x3D 0x03 0x01 0x07 // OID
> 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 (secp256r1)
> 
> 0x03 // Bit string
> 0x42 // Size 66
> 0x00 // Unused bits 0
> 0x03 // Compressed
> ...... 32 bytes X
> 
> Total of 59 bytes
> 
> 
> ======================================================
> Helpful Sources of Information
> ======================================================
> 
> In addition to relevant RFCs and the estimates done by Jim, the following
> references were helpful:
> 
> Every Byte Explained: The Illustrated TLS 1.3 Connection
> https://tls13.ulfheim.net/
> 
> Digital Certificates for the Internet of Things https://kth.diva-
> portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1153958/FULLTEXT01.pdf
> 
> /John
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
> Date: Saturday, 3 November 2018 at 15:59
> To: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
> Cc: "salvador.p.f@um.es" <salvador.p.f@um.es>es>, "ace@ietf.org"
> <ace@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [Ace] EDHOC standardization
> 
> On Fri, Nov 02, 2018 at 02:55:54PM +0000, John Mattsson wrote:
> > Hi Benjamin, Salvador
> >
> > While DTLS 1.3 have done a very good job of lowering the overhead of the
> record layer when application data is sent (see e.g.
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-lwig-security-protocol-comparison-01 for a
> comparison between different protocols), I do not think the handshake protocol
> is much leaner (is it leaner at all?).
> 
> (There are some handshake messages that are removed entirely.)
> 
> > We tried to make an fair comparison between EDHOC and TLS 1.3 in the
> presentation at IETF 101 (see
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/101/materials/slides-101-ace-key-
> exchange-w-oscore-00). Since then, we have significantly optimized the
> encoding in EDHOC and the upcoming version (-11) is expected to have the
> following message sizes.
> >
> >    Auth.               PSK       RPK       x5t     x5chain
> >    --------------------------------------------------------------------
> >    EDHOC message_1      43        38        38        38
> >    EDHOC message_2      47       121       127       117 + Certificate chain
> >    EDHOC message_3      12        86        92        82 + Certificate chain
> >    --------------------------------------------------------------------
> >    Total               102       245       257       237 + Certificate chains
> >
> > As Salvador writes, the handshakes in TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 are basically the
> same, so the numbers presented at IETF 101 should be a good estimate also for
> DTLS 1.3.
> >
> >    Auth.                PSK       RPK
> >    --------------------------------------------------------------------
> >    (D)TLS message_1     142       107
> >    (D)TLS message_2     135       264
> >    (D)TLS message_3      51       167
> >    --------------------------------------------------------------------
> >    Total                328       538
> 
> Thanks for the numbers!
> 
> > The numbers above include ECDHE. For handshake messages, my
> understanding is that the DTLS 1.3 and TLS 1.3 record layer have exactly the
> same size.
> 
> The DTLS 1.3 ones will be worse, due to the epoch and sequence number fields.
> 
> -Ben
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Ace mailing list
> Ace@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ace