Re: [Acme] ACME draft is now in WGLC.

Jacob Hoffman-Andrews <jsha@eff.org> Mon, 13 March 2017 21:00 UTC

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From: Jacob Hoffman-Andrews <jsha@eff.org>
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Subject: Re: [Acme] ACME draft is now in WGLC.
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As Rich said, the CA/Browser Forum has indeed voted to mandate CAA. Hooray!

On 03/13/2017 01:14 PM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> I've had complete disinterest in CAA which initially was accepted
> by CA/B forum as a "recommendation", which meant that the constraint
> was meaningless.  Rumour has it that CAA will soon be a requirement,
> so I've now published CAA records.  The CAA check is/was easy to
> make and crippling it by not making it a requirement was IMNSHO a
> mistake.
I think by this you mean that the CA/Browser Forum should have mandated
CAA support in its Baseline Requirements, back when it first adopted CAA
as "recommended." Is that right?

I think the analogous goal here is that you'd like the CA/Browser Forum
to mandate use of a DNSSEC-validating recursive resolver during
DNS-based validation procedures. That's great! However, I don't think
mandating use of a DNSSEC-validating resolver in the ACME spec will
achieve that goal, since the CA/Browser Forum is not planning to mandate
use of the ACME spec.

I realize that the CA/Browser Forum seems relatively opaque and hard to
participate in, but if you check their bylaws it is possible for any
member of the public (not just a CA or a Browser) to directly
participate in the mailing list by submitting a simple form. I'd
encourage you to get involved!