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Re: [Acme] ACME draft is now in WGLC.

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Mon, 13 March 2017 20:14 UTC

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Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 20:14:10 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [Acme] ACME draft is now in WGLC.
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On Tue, Mar 07, 2017 at 03:46:00AM +0000, Salz, Rich wrote:
> > Specifically, it 10.3 use of DNSSEC is a RECOMMENDATION, not a
> > requirement:
> > 
> >     https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-05#section-10.3
> > 
> > I would have expected a requirement here.
> 
> The WG consensus has been for recommendation.

I've had complete disinterest in CAA which initially was accepted
by CA/B forum as a "recommendation", which meant that the constraint
was meaningless.  Rumour has it that CAA will soon be a requirement,
so I've now published CAA records.  The CAA check is/was easy to
make and crippling it by not making it a requirement was IMNSHO a
mistake.

Similarly, using a DNSSEC-capable resolver is by no means rocket
science, much of the world is doing just that via Google's,
Verisign's, ... open resolvers.  Leaving the CAs wiggle-room to
avoid what should be standard practice by now makes no sense.

I urge the WG to reconsider.

-- 
	Viktor.

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