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Re: [Add] Not a good BoF meeting

Thomas Peterson <nosretep.samoht@gmail.com> Wed, 24 July 2019 18:16 UTC

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To: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>, add@ietf.org
References: <20190724165643.GA29051@laperouse.bortzmeyer.org>
From: Thomas Peterson <nosretep.samoht@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2019 19:16:02 +0100
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Subject: Re: [Add] Not a good BoF meeting
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As the author of a draft (draft-peterson-doh-dhcp[0]) that provides 
discovery of DoH resolvers, I disagree as "trusting the network" is more 
complicated when there may be many operators and users in a given 
network, any of whom could be a threat. To me it is a positive if 
operators can provide secure means of DNS resolution within their 
network, and clients can choose to use them or not.

Regards

0: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-peterson-dot-dhcp/

On 24/07/2019 17:56, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:
> * discovery of local DoH resolvers (in my opinion, a flawed idea from the
> start: if you trust the local network, you don't need DoH, if you
> don't, you won't trust its DoH announces anyway),

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