[Anima-bootstrap] Crypto parameters [Re: a repost of summary]

Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com> Sun, 05 July 2015 23:25 UTC

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Date: Mon, 06 Jul 2015 11:25:07 +1200
From: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
Organization: University of Auckland
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To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, anima-bootstrap@ietf.org
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Subject: [Anima-bootstrap] Crypto parameters [Re: a repost of summary]
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I'm in catch-up mode:
On 25/06/2015 02:06, Michael Richardson wrote:

...
>      it turns out there is an additional benefit in making the constrained
>      node the TLS "Server" -- side. Specifically, it means that the selection
>      of crypto parameters is done by the more constrained device, 

Point taken, but isn't that also an exposure to a downgrade attack
by a bad actor pretending to be constrained in order to reduce
algorithm or key strength?

   Brian