Re: [Anima] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-39: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Sun, 05 April 2020 02:01 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Esko Dijk <esko.dijk@iotconsultancy.nl>
cc: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, "anima\@ietf.org" <anima@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-39: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Esko Dijk <esko.dijk@iotconsultancy.nl> wrote:
    > The current BRSKI text to me suggests that CA:TRUE is a requirement for
    > the pinned-domain-cert. But I'm okay with not having CA:TRUE for this
    > certificate, as you propose, in which case I think the BRSKI text needs
    > some minor updates on the wording.

    > For example, if it's just a Registrar cert with CA:FALSE and RA:TRUE
    > then it shouldn't be called a "domain CA" cert or "domain cert".

    > If the Registrar is not a CA, it does need to be a Registration
    > Authority (RA). (See Section 2.5.3 / 2.5.5 / 5.5.4 /
    > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6402#section-2.10 )

    > So the requirement for the pinned cert is that it is either RA or CA.
    > (Both seems also possible to encode in the cert, although that seems
    > equivalent to a CA.)

I think you that you are likely correct: every entry in a chain which is not
the EE, has CA:TRUE, and the last one, is the Registrar which ought to have
cmcRA set.

If I were to locate a PKIX-lawyer hat, I would say that the Pledge SHOULD
check this.   Given that there is a strong desire to operate registrar's
using only certificates obtained via ACME (LE), and it will be difficult to
get cmcRA set... I don't know what to do here.
  <Please insert long EMU Thread here>

We have written in the ACP document that a device SHOULD verify the cmcRA bit
is set on any EST server that the device speaks to to renew it's certificate.

Please note that I am saying "device" and not pledge!
We did not insist on cmcRA be set in section 5.1, specifically because we
didn't know if RA:TRUE was something we could insist upon here.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-