Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI
Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Mon, 19 February 2018 19:15 UTC
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Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 14:15:49 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI
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Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com> wrote: >> problem 1. Anoop> The major problem with the procedure is that the registrar doesn’t Anoop> verify the manufacturer. >> >> To translate, the JRC has no obvious way to verify that the "MI" key belongs >> to the manufacturer that they care about. >> >> You actually hit the major reason this is not a problem when you assume: >> > assuming the registrar can’t know all the manufacturers exhaustively >> >> We assume that in a managed network that the JRC *can* know all the >> legitimate manufacturers. The keys can come from sales channel integration >> (via digital "packing slips" perhaps), can be manually loaded by humans, be >> scanned from QR codes on the box, etc. We believe that this is out of scope. > Yes, but please ensure that the draft states this assumption and states > that how it is achieved is out of scope. > Also note the air-gap case described in section 6.3 bullet 3. That's listed > as a security reduction, but if your threat model considers rogue MASAs > to be a real risk, pre-loading vouchers and then totally disconnecting from > the Internet might even be considered a security improvement. I agree that there should be another Security Considerations section. Should we also say something in the Introduction? https://github.com/anima-wg/anima-bootstrap/issues/43 -- Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
- [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI Michael Richardson
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI Brian E Carpenter
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI Anoop Kumar Pandey
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI Michael Richardson
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI Brian E Carpenter
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI Michael Richardson
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI Brian E Carpenter
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI Toerless Eckert
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI Anoop Kumar Pandey
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI Toerless Eckert
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI Anoop Kumar Pandey
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI 'Toerless Eckert'
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI Anoop Kumar Pandey
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI 'Toerless Eckert'
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI Michael Richardson
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI Michael Richardson
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI Anoop Kumar Pandey
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI 'Toerless Eckert'
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI Michael Richardson
- Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI Michael Richardson