Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI

Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com> Mon, 19 February 2018 22:04 UTC

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To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, anima@ietf.org
Cc: Anoop Kumar Pandey <anoop@cdac.in>
References: <003101d3a570$32e4c510$98ae4f30$@cdac.in> <22127.1519000017@obiwan.sandelman.ca> <cc706b20-6e3f-e4da-4dd1-a1076c708a70@gmail.com> <20799.1519067749@obiwan.sandelman.ca>
From: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
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Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2018 11:04:47 +1300
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Subject: Re: [Anima] verification of manufacturer in BRSKI
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On 20/02/2018 08:15, Michael Richardson wrote:
> 
> Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com> wrote:
>     >> problem 1.
>     Anoop> The major problem with the procedure is that the registrar doesn’t
>     Anoop> verify the manufacturer.
>     >> 
>     >> To translate, the JRC has no obvious way to verify that the "MI" key belongs
>     >> to the manufacturer that they care about.
>     >> 
>     >> You actually hit the major reason this is not a problem when you assume:
>     >> > assuming the registrar can’t know all the manufacturers exhaustively
>     >> 
>     >> We assume that in a managed network that the JRC *can* know all the
>     >> legitimate manufacturers.  The keys can come from sales channel integration
>     >> (via digital "packing slips" perhaps), can be manually loaded by humans, be
>     >> scanned from QR codes on the box, etc.  We believe that this is out of scope.
> 
>     > Yes, but please ensure that the draft states this assumption and states
>     > that how it is achieved is out of scope.
> 
>     > Also note the air-gap case described in section 6.3 bullet 3. That's listed
>     > as a security reduction, but if your threat model considers rogue MASAs
>     > to be a real risk, pre-loading vouchers and then totally disconnecting from
>     > the Internet might even be considered a security improvement.
> 
> 
> I agree that there should be another Security Considerations section.
> Should we also say something in the Introduction?

I think Security Considerations is fine for this point.

   Brian

> 
> https://github.com/anima-wg/anima-bootstrap/issues/43
> 
> 
> 
> 
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