Re: [art] Thursday lunch discussion on new techniques for stopping robocalling

[Ned Freed <[e-mail]>]

> > On Mar 17, 2018, at 10:58 AM, Ted Hardie <[e-mail]> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Jonathan, Cullen,
> >
> > I was somewhat surprised that the draft did not have a direct reference to the SIP Hashcash work (especially since Cullen was the author of https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jennings-sip-hashcash-06).  From my perspective at least, it still looks to be a useful historical antecedent to consult, since it is a proof-of-work system (and one on which a bunch of later cryptocurrencies draw).  In particular, its view that this is about a demonstration of work rather than a payment to send may still be a valuable perspective.
> >
> > http://www.hashcash.org/ still appears to be up, by the way, for folks that want to see how its original use case tied into thwarting denial of service attacks.

> I hope someone is soliciting input from the email community, who went through
> this process a decade or so ago and noted that bad actors have much, much
> cheaper access to CPU for proof-of-work than good actors do.

+1

And if anything it's even more lopsided now.

				Ned