[AVTCORE] Comments on draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-circuit-breakers-05

Magnus Westerlund <magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com> Thu, 27 February 2014 14:59 UTC

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Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2014 15:58:56 +0100
From: Magnus Westerlund <magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com>
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Subject: [AVTCORE] Comments on draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-circuit-breakers-05
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(as individual)

I have reviewed draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-circuit-breakers-05 and have
some comments:

1) Section 3:
This modifies the RTCP timing rules to allow RTCP
      reports to be sent early, in some cases immediately, provided the
      average RTCP reporting interval remains unchanged.

I would suggest changing "provided the average RTCP reporting interval
remains unchanged." is changed to:

	provided the RTCP transmission keeps within its bandwidth

The reason is that AVPF does not necessarily keep within the average
reporting interval. As that is commonly under using the RTCP bandwidth.

2) Section 3:
      The use of the RTP/AVPF profile is dependent
      on signalling, but is otherwise generally backwards compatible
      with the RTP/AVP profile, as it keeps the same average RTCP
      reporting interval as the base RTP specification.

I wouldn't claim that it is generally backwards compatible. In many
configurations it would not, and even with the timeout clarification
being proposed in draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-multi-stream-03 there will
still be cases where interoperability would be questionable.

I suggest some other formulations, maybe saying that one can configure
AVPF to be backwards compatible.

3) Section 4:

TCP congestion control intentionally tries to fill
   the router queues, and uses the resulting packet loss as congestion

I think a reference would be appropriate after "TCP congestion control".

4) Section 4.1:

   Accordingly, if a sender of RTP data packets receives two or more
   consecutive RTCP SR or RR packets from the same receiver, and those
   packets correspond to its transmission and have a non-increasing
   extended highest sequence number received field (i.e., the sender
   receivers at least three RTCP SR or RR packets that report the same
   value in the extended highest sequence number received field for an
   SSRC, but the sender has sent RTP data packets for that SSRC that
   would have caused an increase in the reported value of the extended
   highest sequence number received if they had reached the receiver),
   then that sender SHOULD cease transmission (see Section 4.5).

It is a long sentence, and my comment relate to "has sent RTP data
packets for that SSRC that would have caused an increase in the
reported value of the extended highest sequence number"

If the sender sends very few packets, this effects the probability for
this CB to trigger. So if I send only 1 packet per reporting interval,
and each packet is lost with a probability of 10%, then I have 1%
(0.1^2) probability of this being triggered. If I send 10 packets per
interval, then I have 0.1^20 = 1E-20. Thus, it might be worth making
some lower threshold recommendation here. This example assumes equal
distribution of loss also, but if we take into burst a short packet
burst may be likely to be completely lost, while the same amount of
packets may be likelier to have at least one arrive if distributed
over the reporting interval.

5) Section 4.2:

Accordingly, an RTP
   sender that has not received any RTCP SR or RTCP RR packets reporting
   on the SSRC it is using for three or more RTCP reporting intervals
   SHOULD cease transmission (see Section 4.5).

Maybe one should clarify that the reporting intervals used in this
calculation is the interval calculated for the SSRC sending the media.

This is in comparision with 4.1 where the trigger is calculated on a
per remote basis for the received reports from that particular remote

Is there an issue if one gets reports from multiple remote SSRCs on
ones transmission. From a media timeout in a point to point case,
these reports although from many SSRCs should not skew the result as
they would be based on the same underlying data. But, using any two
consecutive reports, does not ensure that one is measuring over an
sufficient long interval.

6) Section 4.2:

When calculating the
   timeout, the fixed minimum RTCP reporting interval SHOULD be used
   (based on the rationale in Section 6.2 of RFC 3550 [RFC3550]).

I think this sentence provides an minor issue if one tries to match
this with the RFC 3550 terminology. fixed minimum (interval) is used
in section 6.2. I think the added "RTCP reporting" is confusing here,
I would suggest to use another formulation here.

I think you may have to define what fixed minimum RTCP reporting
interval means, i.e. the RTCP reporting interval (T or Td?, i.e. with
or without randomization) (and in case of randomization, two random
draws or simple 2*T?) calculated with the current set of RTCP stack
parameters and using the fixed minimum interval (SHOULD be 5 sec).

7) Section 5:

As there is a difference between CB #1 and #3 and #2 that has to do
with that the first (#1 and #3) uses incoming RTCP reports and that #2
uses the CB implementers estimate of what the regular reporting
interval is. Thus, I wonder if there needs to exist include a
reflection over t_rr_int as well as the RTCP SSRC timeout calculation
that we recommend to use 5 seconds as fixed minimal value in those
calculations (if 5 sec larger than t_rr_int).

8) Section 5:

   Reports of ECN-CE packets sent as reduced-size RTCP ECN feedback
   packets without an RTCP SR/RR packet MUST be ignored.

Shouldn't then be accounted as loss event in CB #3? Or are you
assuming that this will anyway be counted in the next compound packets
ECN XR summary?

9) Section 9:

This attack can be avoided if RTCP packets are
   authenticated, for example using the Secure RTP profile [RFC3711].

Maybe this should reference draft-ietf-rtp-security-options for other
potential solutions?


Magnus Westerlund

Services, Media and Network features, Ericsson Research EAB/TXM
Ericsson AB                 | Phone  +46 10 7148287
Färögatan 6                 | Mobile +46 73 0949079
SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden | mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com