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Re: [AVTCORE] Registering AVP Profiles for RTP over QUIC

Roman Shpount <roman@telurix.com> Wed, 11 May 2022 21:12 UTC

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From: Roman Shpount <roman@telurix.com>
Date: Wed, 11 May 2022 17:12:18 -0400
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To: Spencer Dawkins at IETF <spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Registering AVP Profiles for RTP over QUIC
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What about using QUIC for encryption session setup and SRTP for sending
media, similar to DTLS-SRTP? This can be the easiest option to implement.

Best,
_____________
Roman Shpount


On Wed, May 11, 2022 at 4:47 PM Spencer Dawkins at IETF <
spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> Dear AVTCORE,
>
> I've had an open PR in
> https://github.com/SpencerDawkins/sdp-rtp-quic/pull/9 for a while,so I
> could get a sense of how AVT profiles are supposed to work, and I'd like to
> push on that now (with a virtual interim meeting coming up next week)..
>
> The high-level summary of discussion in
> https://github.com/SpencerDawkins/sdp-rtp-quic-issues/issues/5 (note that
> this discussion is in a different repo, because reasons) has been
> roughly,"what's the difference between QUIC/RTP/AVPF and QUIC/RTP/SAVPF"?
>
> The arguments about not registering secure AVP profiles involve
>
>    -  the computational overhead of double encryption for all packets,
>    plus
>    - the payload overhead of 10 bytes per packet since you have 2 HMACs.
>
> The arguments about registering secure AVP profiles seem to revolve around
>
>    - Minimizing the impact of added QUIC support in existing
>    implementations that are using /RTP/SAVPF now.
>    - QUIC encryption protects payloads between QUIC endpoints, but there
>    are many multi-endpoint RTP topologies (
>    https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7667 has about 50 pages of them),
>    and when a middlebox receives  QUIC/RTP/AVPF, it's not obvious whether the
>    middlebox should
>       - forward the RTP payload using  RTP/AVPF (where the outgoing AVPF
>       matches the incoming AVPF), or
>       - forward the RTP payload using RTP/SAVPF, where the outgoing SRTP
>       encryption matches the incoming QUIC
>
> It seems to me that there are three choices:
>
>    - Use only QUIC/RTP/AVPF, and and require middleboxes receiving
>    QUIC/RTP/AVPF traffic to always forward that traffic over RTP/SAVPF
>    - Use only QUIC/RTP/AVPF, and and require senders to signal
>    middleboxes whether they should forward that traffic over RTP/AVPF or
>    RTP/SAVPF
>    - Register both QUIC/RTP/AVPF and QUIC/RTP/SAVPF, and if you have to
>    do double encryption on the QUIC/RTP paths to get RTP/SAVPF on the other
>    side of a middlebox, too bad
>
> So, my questions are,
>
>    - What am I missing here?
>    - Are any of the choices I'm listing obviously the *BEST* choice?
>
> Best,
>
> Spencer
> _______________________________________________
> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
> avt@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt
>

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