Re: [bess] New Version Notification for draft-rosen-bess-secure-l3vpn-00.txt

Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net> Thu, 14 June 2018 09:13 UTC

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From: Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>
Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2018 11:13:09 +0200
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To: "<stephane.litkowski@orange.com>" <stephane.litkowski@orange.com>
Cc: Ron Bonica <rbonica@juniper.net>, "bess@ietf.org" <bess@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [bess] New Version Notification for draft-rosen-bess-secure-l3vpn-00.txt
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Hello Stephane,

I read the draft with deep interest. In my opinion I completely have
opposite view to yours - "niche use case" - quite contrary connecting
customer sites over open infrastructure have already started to happen in
large scale globally.

It is not about adding IPSec tunnel here and there - the crux is about
automating it to accommodate very large scale deployments. Perhaps your
comment is based on this specific point that IPSec today created manually
is a niche and therefor automating it does not make sense. But this is not
about it. It is about transition from SP operated L3VPNs into an
alternative L3VPN paradigm.

Yes I understand that the draft may not be very comfortable for SPs who's
review comes from locking customer to MPLS-L3VPN backbone just like in the
old days they were locking customer to Frame Relay or ATM backbones :).

Maybe our definitions of niche is a bit different, but when I look at the
market cap of SD-WAN vendors it seems like if you would call as niche an
ant in the forest here we are watching an army of elephants entering the
woods.

Yes the draft is just first important step towards standards based open
infra secure interconnects - it can not be treated as full SD-WAN spec as
it is missing a lot of important functionalities today addressed in more or
less proprietary way by any such vendor.

The technology is not new too ...  since day one we had Carrier's Carrier
solution when customers could exchange their routes directly. We also had
tunnel encapsulation attribute in place where we could signal various
parameters of given encap. However putting it all together as Eric did in
this document is IMHO a very important step fwd especially coming under the
umbrella of one specific affiliation :).

I do support this work and I hope this is just one brick which we can start
build on going forward standards based interoperable secure connectivity
over open public IP infrastructure.

Kind regards,
Robert.








On Thu, Jun 14, 2018 at 8:17 AM, <stephane.litkowski@orange.com> wrote:

> Hi Ron,
>
> I have read quickly the document.
> I think the use case of having secure L3VPNs is valid and we already have
> all (or most of) the technology building blocks to do it.
> Now the draft takes a complete upside down approach comparing to our well
> known L3VPNs which are provider provisioned VPNs as you propose to build
> them at the CE side.
> This could be a valid approach but isn't it a niche use case ?
>
> Customer sites connected over the Internet is for sure a use case to
> handle, and we already to it today by establishing an IPSec tunnel towards
> an SP-PE, the tunnel ends in the customer VRF.
> Customer data must not be exposed: also a valid use case. We have some
> customers doing IPSec transport within MPLS VPN for some specific traffic.
> On the other hand, from an SP point of view, when core links are not fully
> trusted, MACSEC or IPSec are also options.
>
> I'm less convinced by the routing that should not be exposed. I agree that
> this is a possibility and a valid use case but I do not think that this is
> a big deal for most of customers (even those requiring more security). The
> good thing of MPLS VPN is the routing complexity is almost pushed to the SP
> and the customer has few things to do and they are happy with that.
>
> The last case of the multitenancy on the customer side is also valid, but
> I also think that it is a niche use case.
>
> My point is that the draft is currently focusing on one scenario which in
> my opinion addresses a niche use case while there may be intermediate
> scenarios (like no multitenancy and/or no need of routing protection) that
> could be more widely applicable.
>
> Brgds,
>
> Stephane
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: BESS [mailto:bess-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ron Bonica
> Sent: Monday, June 11, 2018 21:56
> To: bess@ietf.org
> Subject: [bess] FW: New Version Notification for
> draft-rosen-bess-secure-l3vpn-00.txt
>
> Folks,
>
> Please review and comment on this draft.
>
>                                           Ron
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Sent: Monday, June 11, 2018 3:49 PM
> To: Ron Bonica <rbonica@juniper.net>; Eric Rosen <erosen@juniper.net>;
> Eric Rosen <erosen@juniper.net>
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-rosen-bess-secure-l3vpn-00.txt
>
>
> A new version of I-D, draft-rosen-bess-secure-l3vpn-00.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Eric C. Rosen and posted to the IETF
> repository.
>
> Name:           draft-rosen-bess-secure-l3vpn
> Revision:       00
> Title:          Augmenting RFC 4364 Technology to Provide Secure Layer
> L3VPNs over Public Infrastructure
> Document date:  2018-06-11
> Group:          Individual Submission
> Pages:          19
> URL:         https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rosen-bess-secure-l3vpn-00
>
> Status:     https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rosen-bess-secure-
> l3vpn/
> Htmlized:  https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rosen-bess-secure-l3vpn-00
>
> Htmlized:  https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rosen-bess-
> secure-l3vpn
>
>
> Abstract:
>    The Layer 3 Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology described in RFC
>    4364 is focused on the scenario in which a network Service Provider
>    (SP) maintains a secure backbone network and offers VPN service over
>    that network to its customers.  Customers access the SP's network by
>    attaching "Customer Edge" (CE) routers to "Provider Edge" (PE)
>    routers, and exchanging cleartext IP packets.  PE routers generally
>    serve multiple customers, and prevent unauthorized communication
>    among customers.  Customer data sent across the backbone (from one PE
>    to another) is encapsulated in MPLS, using an MPLS label to associate
>    a given packet with a given customer.  The labeled packets are then
>    sent across the backbone network in the clear, using MPLS transport.
>    However, many customers want a VPN service that is secure enough to
>    run over the public Internet, and which does not require them to send
>    cleartext IP packets to a service provider.  Often they want to
>    connect directly to edge nodes of the public Internet, which does not
>    provide MPLS support.  Each customer may itself have multiple tenants
>    who are not allowed to intercommunicate with each other freely.  In
>    this case, the customer many need to provide a VPN service for the
>    tenants.  This document describes a way in which this can be achieved
>    using the technology of RFC 4364.  The functionality assigned therein
>    to a PE router can be placed instead in Customer Premises Equipment.
>    This functionality can be augmented by transmitting MPLS packets
>    through IPsec Security Associations.  The BGP control plane sessions
>    can also be protected by IPsec.  This allows a customer to use RFC
>    4364 technology to provide VPN service to its internal departments,
>    while sending only IPsec-protected packets to the Internet or other
>    backbone network, and eliminating the need for MPLS transport in the
>    backbone.
>
>
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at
> tools.ietf.org.
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
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