Re: [BLISS] AD review: draft-ietf-bliss-shared-appearances-06
Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com> Fri, 27 January 2012 20:49 UTC
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Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2012 14:49:15 -0600
From: Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com>
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To: Alan Johnston <alan.b.johnston@gmail.com>
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Cc: bliss@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [BLISS] AD review: draft-ietf-bliss-shared-appearances-06
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Hi Alan - Going through the threads leading to version -09 - there were some things in this message that I'm not seeing an obvious resolution to. Can you point to where or how they were addressed? (Trimming to the things that I think might still be outstanding) On 3/2/11 12:11 PM, Alan Johnston wrote: > I am finally working on a revision to the document. See below for > comments on the minor issues. There hasn't been any comments on the > major issues (changing 409 with 400 and updating RFC 3261 and 4235). > > Comments most welcome. I should have the changes described here done > in the next few days. > > - Alan - <big snip/> >>> Section 5.4 talks about proxies inserting an Alert-Info field. Section >>> 11 talks about proxies inserting and removing them. Both of these sections >>> use non-normative terms. Where is the normative behavior for proxies participating >>> in this feature defined? Also, for section 11. "If an Alert-Info is already present, >>> the proxy either removes the Alert-Info if it is not trusted, or adds >>> the 'appearance' parameter to the Alert-Info header field." >>> It's not clear that RFC3261 allows a proxy to modify (in particular delete) >>> existing Alert-Info header fields. > You are correct that RFC 3261 does not explicitly allow this, although > every real system does so. I would prefer to update RFC 3261 to > explicitly allow proxies to apply trust domain rules in modifying and > deleting Alert-Info header fields and parameters. However, if this > causes trouble, we can remove it. I'm working on some text for this. I'm not sure I follow what happened in the text around this. Section 11 ended up removed. Can you summarize what the changes were that addressed it? <snip> >> Where is there a description of how the joined and replaced dialog xml elements >> are compared - there's an opportunity for error in implementation if they get >> the perspective of local and remote tag incorrect - where is the text that describes >> what to compare these against? > I'll look at Replaces and Join and add in similar text. Did that happen? (It may have, but I'm not spotting it quickly). <snip/> > >>> Section 10.1 : Do you want to also call out authorizing publishes? Suggest >>> rephrasing to avoid using "the same". > Will do. I think you adjusted the phrasing, bit did you talk about authorizing publishes? <snip/> > >> 10.9 : Note that Bob's UA is configured not to, not that Bob chooses not >> to have an appearance number. What normative texts suppresses the normal dialog >> state change notifications at the end of the paragraph? > There is none. Probably these NOTIFYs would get sent, although they > are of no use to anyone. You fixed the issues with the text around normal notifications, but it still says Bob chooses not to have an appearance number. This is a nit, and I'm not going to stick on it, but please look to make sure that's what you really mean to say. I think you mean the software in Bob's UA is programmed to and that you don't mean to imply that Bob is going to have to punch a button on the phone at this point in time to communicate a choice to the UA. <snip/> > >>> 11 - What text precludes a UA from putting in its own appearance number? >>> > Nothing, but this yet another case why a proxy must be able to > delete/modify Alert-Infos that are not correct or come from an > untrusted source. There should be some discussion of this in the document somewhere - am I overlooking it? <snip/> (There was a discussion about making it easier to use /= for future extensions to the ABNF for this parameter that I don't think resulted in a change, but I'll come back to it later). <snip/> >>> Section 12 - This MUST to authenticate with Digest or S/MIME is stronger >>> than the Replaces spec requires for a generic INVITE/Replaces - were you >>> intending to further restrict the admission policy for INVITES associated >>> with this extension? > No, I'll check the INVITE/Replaces security considerations and make it match. What change resulted? ---- Thanks for helping me check these! RjS
- [BLISS] AD review: draft-ietf-bliss-shared-appear… Robert Sparks
- Re: [BLISS] AD review: draft-ietf-bliss-shared-ap… Alan Johnston
- Re: [BLISS] AD review: draft-ietf-bliss-shared-ap… Alan Johnston
- Re: [BLISS] AD review: draft-ietf-bliss-shared-ap… Robert Sparks