Re: [Captive-portals] Thoughts/comments on draft-nottingham-capport-problem-01

David Bird <dbird@google.com> Fri, 11 March 2016 00:10 UTC

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Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 16:09:57 -0800
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From: David Bird <dbird@google.com>
To: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
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Cc: captive-portals@ietf.org, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [Captive-portals] Thoughts/comments on draft-nottingham-capport-problem-01
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I'm not aware of any CP detection being triggered only based on the SSID.
(What does it do if there actually isn't a CP?) ...

An attacker gets a LOT more mileage out of a Open SSID evil twin with NO
captive portal if the desire is to capture cookies... Any attacker that
gets tripped up by clients doing a Sandboxed browser isn't a very good
attacker :)

David


On Thu, Mar 10, 2016 at 3:51 PM, Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> wrote:

> On 8 Mar 2016, at 8:11 PM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > On 8 March 2016 at 18:45, Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> wrote:
> >> I've seen CPs that ask for Facebook username and password, but NOT over
> HTTPS, and not to a Facebook domain (IIRC); it's more of a user education /
> security UX problem than anything.
> >
> >
> > That's perhaps an extreme - and horrific - example of what I thought
> > you intended here.
> >
> > Loading a real browser allows a CP to close the loop with tracking
> > bugs.  That is less offensive, though to what degree might depend on
> > where you sit.
> >
> > There are probably plenty of potentially relevant reasons too.  For
> > example, a network operator might simply want to authorize one set of
> > users (their paying customers) over others.  A sandbox in that context
> > represents a hurdle for their users, who can't rely on cookies or
> > other preexisting state.  The sandbox then has security drawbacks in
> > that it encourages users to pick less secure passwords.
>
> One aspect that's potentially different is that current CP detection
> implementations (going to add a term for that :) can be automatically
> triggered; if the OS recognises a SSID ("ATTWifi", anyone?), it'll pop up a
> window.
>
> Without sandboxing, that means the network gets tracking data without any
> user intent in a very common case. An attacker can also spoof a common SSID
> to gather such data.
>
> Of course, OSs could stop automatically joining Wifi networks, but that
> would make for a lot of unhappy users...
>
>
> --
> Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/
>
>