Re: [Cellar] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-cellar-ffv1-16

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Thu, 23 July 2020 17:50 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Liang Xia <frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
cc: secdir@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org, draft-ietf-cellar-ffv1.all@ietf.org, cellar@ietf.org
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Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2020 13:50:09 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Cellar] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-cellar-ffv1-16
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Liang Xia via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
    > But about my one question, I have not seen any response or actions: "Issues for
    > clarification: In Security Considerations, besides the DoS attacks brought by
    > the malicious payloads, is there any other kinds of attack possibly? For
    > example, virus or worm are hidden in the malicious payloads to attack the
    > system for more damages? Does it make sense and what's the consideration?"

Hi, thank you for the review comments.
Aside from possible buffer-overflow attacks that would attempt to smash the
stack of a process, none of the content carried in ffv1 is intended to be executable.

A virus or worm hidden in the payload would be rendered as if it was visual
data by normal software processing.

Clearly, a malicious system could use the ffv1 format in an attempt to disquise
itself, but that would take a co-consipirator to extract that content.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>ca>, Sandelman Software Works
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