Re: [certid] [Gen-art] Gen-ART LC Review of draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check-11

Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> Wed, 08 December 2010 00:13 UTC

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From: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>
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Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2010 18:14:41 -0600
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Cc: draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check.all@tools.ietf.org, General Area Review Team <gen-art@ietf.org>, certid@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [certid] [Gen-art] Gen-ART LC Review of draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check-11
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WFM, thanks.

On Dec 7, 2010, at 1:29 PM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:

> Regarding NAPTR...
> 
> On 12/6/10 10:19 AM, Ben Campbell wrote:
> 
>> -- 1.4.2, 2nd bullet item: "We also do not address identifiers
>> derived from Naming Authority Pointer (NAPTR) DNS resource records
>> [NAPTR] and related technologies such as [S-NAPTR], since such
>> identifiers cannot be validated in a trusted manner in the absence of
>> [DNSSEC]."
>> 
>> Does that mean validation of a source domain that will be used to
>> construct a NAPTR request is out of scope, or just validation against
>> the result of a NAPTR query? (I note SIP may require the first).
> 
> Ben, the current text in the I-D is lame. The points we were trying to
> make, but poorly, are that (1) there are no identifiers for NAPTR
> records, as there are for SRV records, and (2) from the perspective of
> this spec it doesn't really matter how you get from the source domain to
> the IP address you use for communication (perhaps you do the A/AAAA
> one-step, the SRV two-step, or the NAPTR three-step, but that's
> immaterial for the purpose of identity checking).
> 
> Point #1 is close to obvious, so I suggest that we remove the offending
> sentence and add this paragraph near the end of Section 1.4.2:
> 
>   Although the process whereby a client resolves the DNS domain name of
>   an application service can involve several steps (e.g., this is true
>   of resolutions that depend on DNS SRV resource records, Naming
>   Authority Pointer (NAPTR) DNS resource records [NAPTR], and related
>   technologies such as [S-NAPTR]), for our purposes we care only about
>   the fact that the client needs to verify the identity of the entity
>   with which it communicates as a result of the resolution process.
>   The resolution process itself is out of scope.
> 
> Peter
> 
> -- 
> Peter Saint-Andre
> https://stpeter.im/
> 
> 
> 
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