[Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-12.txt

internet-drafts@ietf.org Tue, 05 May 2020 15:19 UTC

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Subject: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-12.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum RG of the IRTF.

        Title           : Randomness Improvements for Security Protocols
        Authors         : Cas Cremers
                          Luke Garratt
                          Stanislav Smyshlyaev
                          Nick Sullivan
                          Christopher A. Wood
	Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-12.txt
	Pages           : 10
	Date            : 2020-05-05

   Randomness is a crucial ingredient for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   and related security protocols.  Weak or predictable
   "cryptographically-strong" pseudorandom number generators (CSPRNGs)
   can be abused or exploited for malicious purposes.  The Dual_EC_DRBG
   random number backdoor and Debian bugs are relevant examples of this
   problem.  An initial entropy source that seeds a CSPRNG might be weak
   or broken as well, which can also lead to critical and systemic
   security problems.  This document describes a way for security
   protocol participants to augment their CSPRNGs using long-term
   private keys.  This improves randomness from broken or otherwise
   subverted CSPRNGs.

   This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG)
   in the IRTF.

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