[Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-12.txt
internet-drafts@ietf.org Tue, 05 May 2020 15:19 UTC
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Subject: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-12.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum RG of the IRTF. Title : Randomness Improvements for Security Protocols Authors : Cas Cremers Luke Garratt Stanislav Smyshlyaev Nick Sullivan Christopher A. Wood Filename : draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-12.txt Pages : 10 Date : 2020-05-05 Abstract: Randomness is a crucial ingredient for Transport Layer Security (TLS) and related security protocols. Weak or predictable "cryptographically-strong" pseudorandom number generators (CSPRNGs) can be abused or exploited for malicious purposes. The Dual_EC_DRBG random number backdoor and Debian bugs are relevant examples of this problem. An initial entropy source that seeds a CSPRNG might be weak or broken as well, which can also lead to critical and systemic security problems. This document describes a way for security protocol participants to augment their CSPRNGs using long-term private keys. This improves randomness from broken or otherwise subverted CSPRNGs. This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) in the IRTF. The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements/ There are also htmlized versions available at: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-12 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-12 A diff from the previous version is available at: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-12 Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at: ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
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