Re: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance

Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> Tue, 02 July 2013 20:31 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance
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Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2013 20:31:34 +0000
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Cc: cfrg <cfrg@irtf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance
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On Jul 2, 2013, at 11:01 PM, "Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
> 
> 
>>>>>> - I'm not sure about AES-GMAC for ESP authentication. Is there a reason why someone would prefer to use AES-CBC or AES-CTR with AES-GMAC rather than AES-GCM? Also, the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm has gained popularity recently (meaning that a lot of customers are asking for it). It runs significantly slower than HMAC-SHA1, but people have stopped reading at "SHA-1 is no longer secure". Still, they're not asking for GMAC, they're asking for SHA-256. So I think a document where the goal is interoperability should focus on what is becoming the de-facto standard as long as it's secure enough.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Having the document list the rationale for using GMAC instead of an HMAC would indeed be good.
>>>> 
>>>> I know, I know. Because it's faster. But we have GCM for that.
>>> 
>>> And saying so in the document would be valuable.
>> 
>> I'm still looking for the rationale for SHOULD, let alone SHOULD+ for it.
> 
> With AE modes there is no rationale to use separate encryption and authentication that I can think of.  The rationale of using GMAC instead of HMAC-SHA* is: (a) better performance, and (b) security proofs make better (to my taste) assumptions. These two should be sufficient.

And I'm not objecting to it being a SHOULD with or without + for AH. I'm only asking about ESP.