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Re: [Cfrg] The SESPAKE protocol and PAKE requirements

Schmidt, Jörn-Marc <Joern-Marc.Schmidt@secunet.com> Tue, 23 February 2016 06:52 UTC

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From: "Schmidt, Jörn-Marc" <Joern-Marc.Schmidt@secunet.com>
To: "Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev" <smyshsv@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: The SESPAKE protocol and PAKE requirements
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Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2016 06:52:31 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] The SESPAKE protocol and PAKE requirements
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Dear Stanislav,

Thank you for your input!

>What do you think about defining a policy of algorithm usage in PAKE protocols? 
>For example, in the current version of SESPAKE RFC draft we are based on Russian standards – GOST R 34.11-2012 hash and HMAC, but of course the >document that refers only to GOSTs cannot become a CFRG document. 

>Shouldn't we require multi-algorithm support – as in the PAKE requirements, as in our SESPAKE?

You mean to add a requirement to state which algorithms can be used as underlying primitives? 
I haven't analyzed SESPAKE in detail - but wouldn't it work with any cryptographic hash function? 
In case a PAKE requires a special property of the underlying hash function/cipher/etc., I think this could be covered with
"R2: A PAKE scheme SHOULD come with a security proof and clearly state its assumptions and models." by adding a sentence about useful primitives.

I personally would leave it up to the designer of the PAKE scheme to decide whether the scheme mentions a specific primitive (e.g. is specified using AES & SHA2) or leaves it up to the implementer (e.g. speaking of block cipher & hash function in an abstract manner). Do you think we should push in one direction in the requirements draft?

Best regards,

Jörn

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