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Re: [Cfrg] Keccak worry?

Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> Mon, 09 November 2015 14:18 UTC

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Date: Mon, 09 Nov 2015 15:18:44 +0100
From: Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Keccak worry?
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On Mon, 9 Nov 2015 12:44:32 +0000
Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com> wrote:

> ia.cr/2015/1085 describes a malicious variant of Keccak.
> 
> Should we now worry about Keccak?

One interesting question would be: In case Keccak would've been
submitted with those bad parameters - would've people noticed?

If people who participated in analyzing SHA3 candidates are reading
this: What do you think? Would you have spotted this?

cu,
-- 
Hanno Böck
http://hboeck.de/

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