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Re: [CFRG] [EXTERNAL] pq firmware signing question

Falko Strenzke <falko.strenzke@mtg.de> Mon, 18 March 2024 14:36 UTC

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Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2024 15:35:46 +0100
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To: Kris Kwiatkowski <kris@amongbytes.com>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Cc: "Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)" <sfluhrer@cisco.com>, Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth=40entrust.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <Cfrg@irtf.org>
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From: Falko Strenzke <falko.strenzke@mtg.de>
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Subject: Re: [CFRG] [EXTERNAL] pq firmware signing question
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And this is a (one of the many on the net) summary of NXP's secure boot 
mechanism, which also burns the trust anchor certificates into the 
device's memory permanently:

https://variwiki.com/index.php?title=High_Assurance_Boot_MX8&release=RELEASE_DUNFELL_V1.5_VAR-SOM-MX8

NXP i.MX platforms are application processors, meaning they are meant to 
run operating systems like Linux as the basis for a wide range of 
industrial and consumer electronics applications.

For the background: permanent trust anchors for firmware update 
verification are needed to achieve a sufficient level of trust in the 
device's ability to always perform secure updates, no matter what type 
of attacker – remote or local – may have previously interfered with the 
device.

- Falko

Am 17.03.24 um 23:12 schrieb Kris Kwiatkowski:
>> On 18 Mar 2024, at 08:00, Stephen Farrell<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>  wrote:
>>
>> What I'm trying to understand is how prevalent such devices might be,
>> and therefore how much to weigh their specific requirements against
>> what's needed for almost all devices that don't have those specific
>> requirements.
> Quite prevalent - whatever needs secure boot (mobile phones and SmartNICs are two types of devices I personally worked with). Section about secure boot in ARM documentation is good place to start:
> https://developer.arm.com/documentation/PRD29-GENC-009492/c/TrustZone-Software-Architecture/Booting-a-secure-system/Secure-boot
>
> _______________________________________________
> CFRG mailing list
> CFRG@irtf.org
> https://mailman.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
-- 

*MTG AG*
Dr. Falko Strenzke
Executive System Architect

Phone: +49 6151 8000 24
E-Mail: falko.strenzke@mtg.de
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