Re: [cnit] CNIT Charter bashing..

Are we planning to submit a charter in the next couple of days, and then see if we can get a slot at the next IETF?

Brian
> On May 28, 2015, at 1:55 PM, Richard Shockey <richard@shockey.us> wrote:
> 
> 
> A fair argument but I don’t want to spend 5 years waiting for a series of normative dependencies on the trust model before actually understanding what headers can/should be used here. 
> 
> 
> Its much too difficult to get things done in the IETF as it is.   I’d much prefer building from success starting with the definition of the data object then ..then folding that into a trust model and frankly given what we have seen in STIR I’m not sure your argument holds up. Again the MARTINI model.
> 
> Didn’t you recently  say something about “perfection is the enemy of the good”  :-) 
> 
> 
> 
> From: Eric Burger <eburger@standardstrack.com <mailto:eburger@standardstrack.com>>
> Date: Wednesday, May 27, 2015 at 10:11 PM
> To: <cnit@ietf.org <mailto:cnit@ietf.org>>
> Subject: Re: [cnit] CNIT Charter bashing..
> 
> On May 25, 2015, at 5:31 PM, Richard Shockey <richard@shockey.us <mailto:richard@shockey.us>> wrote:
>> 
>> From: Mary Barnes <mary.ietf.barnes@gmail.com <mailto:mary.ietf.barnes@gmail.com>>
>> Date: Friday, May 22, 2015 at 12:58 PM
>> Attached is what I have at this point. Really, the only thing I'm struggling with is the milestones as I don't think we can request publication of the data object and headers without having defined the trust model. 
>> 
>> 
>> RS> Mary I’m not sure about that statement. I can certainly anticipate several deployment models where the trust mechanism (aka signing) does not need to be formally integrated in the solution especially those where the exchange of data is more bi-lateral and the trust mechanism is at lower layers of the stack than the signaling. My initial concern  is what is the header and what is the data object(s) carried in the header. How the CNIT data is created should not be our concern.
> 
> I do not buy it. If there are private agreements between service providers, they have private agreements. They can do whatever they want.
> 
> Last I looked, this is the Internet Engineering Task Force. Assume untrusted transport across the wide open Internet, and trust no endpoint that cannot cryptographically prove who they are. If it happens two service providers exchange CNIT data over a single, yellow cable, then it is a benefit that no state-sponsored security service can listen in on the cable.
> 
> I do not want to take three years to build a protocol and two more years after that for products to be available just to have a system that only works in walled gardens. I do not want to be the person that has to explain to the media why Calling Name Delivery is just as broken as it always was and it will be another five years before the world sees a real solution.
> 
> Let us get this right the first time.
> [snip]
> _______________________________________________ cnit mailing list cnit@ietf.org <mailto:cnit@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cnit <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cnit>_______________________________________________
> cnit mailing list
> cnit@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cnit