Re: [cnit] CNIT Charter bashing..

["DOLLY, MARTIN C" <[e-mail]>]

Richard this is my understanding.

From: cnit [mailto:[e-mail]] On Behalf Of Richard Shockey
Sent: Wednesday, June 10, 2015 11:01 PM
To: Brian Rosen; Henning Schulzrinne
Cc: [e-mail]
Subject: Re: [cnit] CNIT Charter bashing..



Here is what I want to know now.

Before we start to process this concept I want to know how relevant the existing CNAM service is deployed outside North America.

I'm told by reliable sources that the CNAM service is not deployed anywhere among the major telecom markets in Europe or Asia. Not Japan China or South Korea UK Italy France and in fact it might actually be illegal under the strict privacy regulations in Germany.

I don't know.

That said our friends at Apple seem to understand there is a problem here. I have tried to engage the most senior management at Google about who would be responsible for defining how the VoLTE CUA could actually display an advanced call display data and frankly no one knows.

http://www.businessinsider.com/apple-update-in-ios9-suggests-caller-id-2015-6

There is a realistic question if this is simply a North American specific problem why is this  a IETF issue. You might ask the same question of MODERN but I frankly don't want to go there.




From: Richard Shockey <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Date: Tuesday, June 2, 2015 at 12:35 PM
To: Brian Rosen <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Cc: <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Subject: Re: [cnit] CNIT Charter bashing..


Hopefully but I still haven't seen any response to my concern about normative dependencies on STIR.

If we can define the object/headers first then I don't have a issue.

-
Richard Shockey
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From: Brian Rosen <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Date: Tuesday, June 2, 2015 at 12:26 PM
To: Richard Shockey <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Cc: Eric Burger <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>, <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Subject: Re: [cnit] CNIT Charter bashing..

Are we planning to submit a charter in the next couple of days, and then see if we can get a slot at the next IETF?

Brian
On May 28, 2015, at 1:55 PM, Richard Shockey <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:


A fair argument but I don't want to spend 5 years waiting for a series of normative dependencies on the trust model before actually understanding what headers can/should be used here.


Its much too difficult to get things done in the IETF as it is.   I'd much prefer building from success starting with the definition of the data object then ..then folding that into a trust model and frankly given what we have seen in STIR I'm not sure your argument holds up. Again the MARTINI model.

Didn't you recently  say something about "perfection is the enemy of the good"  :-)



From: Eric Burger <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Date: Wednesday, May 27, 2015 at 10:11 PM
To: <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Subject: Re: [cnit] CNIT Charter bashing..

On May 25, 2015, at 5:31 PM, Richard Shockey <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:

From: Mary Barnes <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Date: Friday, May 22, 2015 at 12:58 PM
Attached is what I have at this point. Really, the only thing I'm struggling with is the milestones as I don't think we can request publication of the data object and headers without having defined the trust model.


RS> Mary I'm not sure about that statement. I can certainly anticipate several deployment models where the trust mechanism (aka signing) does not need to be formally integrated in the solution especially those where the exchange of data is more bi-lateral and the trust mechanism is at lower layers of the stack than the signaling. My initial concern  is what is the header and what is the data object(s) carried in the header. How the CNIT data is created should not be our concern.

I do not buy it. If there are private agreements between service providers, they have private agreements. They can do whatever they want.

Last I looked, this is the Internet Engineering Task Force. Assume untrusted transport across the wide open Internet, and trust no endpoint that cannot cryptographically prove who they are. If it happens two service providers exchange CNIT data over a single, yellow cable, then it is a benefit that no state-sponsored security service can listen in on the cable.

I do not want to take three years to build a protocol and two more years after that for products to be available just to have a system that only works in walled gardens. I do not want to be the person that has to explain to the media why Calling Name Delivery is just as broken as it always was and it will be another five years before the world sees a real solution.

Let us get this right the first time.
[snip]
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