Re: [core] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-core-object-security-08

[Göran Selander <[e-mail]>]

How about this (see the last and third to last edit):
https://github.com/core-wg/oscoap/commit/8f277d83

where the reference is made to COSE instead of AEAD?

Best
Göran


On 2018-02-23 15:32, "Joel Halpern Direct" <[e-mail]>
wrote:

>I guess it is up to you.  Personally, I like the idea of the verify
>description including some reference to how one actually does verify.
>I will leave it to the authors and WG to decide what degree of clarity
>is called for here.
>
>Yours,
>Joel
>
>On 2/23/18 9:30 AM, Göran Selander wrote:
>> Hi Joel,
>> 
>> Thanks for quick feedback, inline.
>> 
>> On 2018-02-23 14:59, "Joel M. Halpern" <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> 
>>> In terms of my concerns, if Step 7 said "Verify and Decrypt the COSE
>>> object using the Recipient Key as per RFC 5116 Section 2.2" that would
>>> fill in the confusion for this reader.
>> 
>> Since the AEAD is used throughout the draft, in particular in other
>>parts
>> of this section I’m thinking that maybe we should add RFC 5116 to the
>>list
>> of specifications following "Readers are expected to be familiar with”
>>in
>> Section 1.1. Would that address your comment?
>> 
>> Thanks
>> Göran
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>>
>>> Yours,
>>> Joel
>>>
>>> On 2/23/18 5:26 AM, Göran Selander wrote:
>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>
>>>> Thanks for your review. Comments inline.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 2018-02-22 04:51, "Joel Halpern" <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Reviewer: Joel Halpern
>>>>> Review result: Ready with Nits
>>>>>
>>>>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
>>>>> Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
>>>>> by the IESG for the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just
>>>>> like any other last call comments.
>>>>>
>>>>> For more information, please see the FAQ at
>>>>>
>>>>> <https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>>>>>
>>>>> Document: draft-ietf-core-object-security-08
>>>>> Reviewer: Joel Halpern
>>>>> Review Date: 2018-02-21
>>>>> IETF LC End Date: 2018-03-02
>>>>> IESG Telechat date: 2018-03-08
>>>>>
>>>>> Summary: This document is ready for publication as a Proposed
>>>>>Standard
>>>>> RFC
>>>>>
>>>>> Major issues: N/A
>>>>>
>>>>> Minor issues:
>>>>>      In section 8.2 on verifying the request, step 5 says to
>>>>>"compose"
>>>>> the
>>>>>      Additional Authentication Data.  I would have expected it to be
>>>>> "verify"
>>>>>      the Additional Authentication Data.  I could imagine that the
>>>>> verification
>>>>>      consists of composing what it should be, and then comparing with
>>>>> what
>>>>> is
>>>>>      received.  But I do not see the comparison step.  is it
>>>>>implicit in
>>>>> some
>>>>>      other step?  This occurs again in 8.4, so I presume I am simply
>>>>> missing
>>>>>      something.  This may suggest some clarification could be useful.
>>>>
>>>> The AAD is indeed “composed" both on encrypting and decrypting side
>>>>from
>>>> data which needs to be known to the endpoint at the time when the AEAD
>>>> operation is performed. The authenticated decryption process is
>>>> described
>>>> in:
>>>>
>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5116#section-2.2
>>>>
>>>> So the verification consists of feeding the input, including the AAD,
>>>>to
>>>> the authenticated decryption which calculates the plain text or FAIL,
>>>> and
>>>> a failure may be - but is not necessarily - caused by wrong AAD.
>>>>
>>>> The AD review also indicated that we should move the reference to RFC
>>>> 5116
>>>> to an early section in the draft and that change is already included
>>>>in
>>>> the latest version on the CoRE WG Github.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Best regards
>>>> Göran
>>>>
>>