Re: [Curdle] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-10
denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> Sat, 02 September 2017 08:27 UTC
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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 02 Sep 2017 03:27:51 -0500
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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2.all@ietf.org, ietf@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-10
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Hello Russ, thank you for the review. Comments: > I think that a better title for this document would be: > Use of RSA Keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 in Secure Shell (SSH) I can make this change, but I should note this is not universally agreed on. In a previous specification, which became RFC 6668: https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6668.txt ... the original draft called for e.g. "hmac-sha256", but there were immediate concerns about ambiguity which led to "hmac-sha2-256" and "hmac-sha2-512" being specified. > The current wording seems to include SHA-224 and SHA-384, > and that is not the intent of the author. True, but in this case as well, I point out RFC 6668, where we have the title: "SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol" ... even though the document only specifies "hmac-sha2-256" and "hmac-sha2-512". It appears to me that it may not be necessary for a document to specify use of all versions of SHA-2, in order to be accurately described as specifying the use of SHA-2 in a context. > I did not propose changing the strings in case people have > already implemented against this specification. If no one > has implemented yet, then I would change those too. This intuition is correct. It has been widely implemented and is deployed on, very possibly, millions of systems. One can launch an off-the-shelf Amazon instance that has a long-term-support edition of Ubuntu with a version of OpenSSH that implements this. > Section 5.1 should be expanded to say that following the NIST > advice on key sizes and SHA-1 outside the US Government is > prudent. I can do this. As instructed, I await instructions from the document shepherd. denis On Fri, Sep 1, 2017 at 8:55 AM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote: > Reviewer: Russ Housley > Review result: Almost Ready > > I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area > Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed > by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please wait for direction from your > document shepherd or AD before posting a new version of the draft. > > For more information, please see the FAQ at > <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>. > > Document: draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-10 > Reviewer: Russ Housley > Review Date: 2017-09-01 > IETF LC End Date: 2017-09-11 > IESG Telechat date: unknown > > Summary: Almost Ready > > Major Concerns: None > > > Minor Concerns: > > I think that a better title for this document would be: > > Use of RSA Keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 in Secure Shell (SSH) > > These are two of the hash function in the SHA2 family, and there is no > ambiguity about them being part of the SHA3 family. Similarly, I think > that the Abstract and Section 1 should explicitly names these two hash > functions. The current wording seems to include SHA-224 and SHA-384, > and that is not the intent of the author. > > In Section 3, I suggest: > s/using SHA-2 [SHS] as hash./using SHA-256 or SHA-512 [SHS] as hash./ > s/the hash used is SHA-2 256./the hash used is SHA-256./ > s/the hash used is SHA-2 512./the hash used is SHA-512./ > > Note: I did not propose changing the strings in case people have already > implemented against this specification. If no one has implemented yet, > then I would change those too. > > > Section 5.1 should be expanded to say that following the NIST advice on > key sizes and SHA-1 outside the US Government is prudent. > > > Nits: None > > > _______________________________________________ > Curdle mailing list > Curdle@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle >
- [Curdle] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-cu… Russ Housley
- Re: [Curdle] Genart last call review of draft-iet… denis bider
- Re: [Curdle] [Gen-art] Genart last call review of… Alissa Cooper
- Re: [Curdle] Genart last call review of draft-iet… Daniel Migault