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Re: [Curdle] comments on draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-03.txt

denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> Sat, 08 April 2017 11:20 UTC

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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 08 Apr 2017 05:20:49 -0600
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Cc: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>, "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] comments on draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-03.txt
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I tend to agree. While it is plausible that PSS avoids providing
implementers an easy way to incorrectly verify a signature, I am not in
favor of banning working concepts because they've been implemented
incorrectly.

By that token, the most important proviso we should put in the drafts is:
"Do not, under any circumstances, implement this protocol in a memory
unsafe language, such as C or C++"...

On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 9:42 PM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> writes:
>
> >I strongly object. PKCS 1.5 signature verification has a long and
> inglorious
> >history of exploitation. PSS does not.
>
> That's because nothing uses PSS, so there's no chance to exploit it.  By
> that
> argument we should all be using IYOPS, which not only isn't implemented but
> hasn't even been defined yet, making it even more immune to exploitation.
>
> The problem with PKCS #1 was that people implemented it wrong in a variety
> of
> ways, if you follow the spec (encode-then-memcmp) then it's perfectly
> sound.
> Given that most PKCS #1 implementations should by now have been fixed (it's
> been what, 20 years) while if we moved to PSS we'd be starting again from
> scratch with everyone getting the chance to mess things up in different
> ways,
> PSS is at best no better than PKCS #1, at worst a lot worse.
>
> Peter.
>

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