Re: [Dcrup] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-crypto

Scott Kitterman <sklist@kitterman.com> Tue, 19 December 2017 01:54 UTC

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Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2017 01:54:18 +0000
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From: Scott Kitterman <sklist@kitterman.com>
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Subject: Re: [Dcrup] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-crypto
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On December 18, 2017 8:43:22 PM EST, John Levine <johnl@taugh.com> wrote:
>>Simultaneously: John, your comments in reply to this?
>
>>> 1.  The existing RFC 6376 signature algorithms specify what to use
>for
>>> hash-
>>> alg.  That's missing from the Ed25519-SHA256 definition in section
>3.  As
>>> implied by the name (and discussed on the list), the hash-alg should
>be
>>> SHA256.  Recommend replacing the leading sentence phrase in section
>3 with:
>>>
>>> The Ed25519-SHA256 Signing Algorithm computes a message hash as
>described
>>> in
>>> Section 3.7  of [RFC6376] using SHA-256 [FIPS-180-3-2008] as the
>hash-alg,
>
>That's fine.
>
>>> 2.  For clarity, per some of the IETF LC feedback on
>draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-
>>> usage, recommend adding after the main body of section 3 and before
>the
>>> note:
>>>
>>> This is an additional DKIM signature algorithm added to Section 3.3
>of
>>> [RFC6376] as envisioned in Section 3.3.4 of [RFC6376].
>
>Also fine.
>
>>> 3.  Private key storage format
>>>
>>> Unlike RSA, Ed25519 does not appear to have a standardized textual
>>> format.  I
>>> think it might make sense to specify that for DKIM Ed25519 purposes
>the
>>> private key is stored as the base64 encoded output of the RFC 8032
>Section
>>> 5.1.5 private key generation processes.  This would provide a
>(slightly)
>>> human readable private key representation that could be used by
>different
>>> implementations so that operators can safely switch implementations
>without
>>> regenerating keys and that are more understandable for trouble
>shooting
>>> purposes.
>
>OK by me but I'm no crypto expert.  Perhaps we could ask the openssl
>folks what
>key format they'll be using.
>
>>> 4.  Examples
>>>
>>> It would be nice to have at least one signing example for
>implementers to
>>> use to verify correctness.  I currently have either a signing bug or
>a
>>> verification bug in my work and I'm not sure which.  If I had a
>known
>>> correct example to bounce my signing results against, that would
>help a lot.
>
>A reasonable albeit somewhat painful request.  What ed25519 library are
>you using?

I'm using python-nacl, which wraps libsodium.

https://pynacl.readthedocs.io/en/stable/
https://download.libsodium.org/doc/

Scott K