Re: [dmarc-ietf] External review of draft-kucherawy-dmarc-base-01

[Franck Martin <[e-mail]>]

Let me respond to some...

I feel a lot is editorial issues that Murray will certainly fix to make the spec clearer.

----- Original Message -----
> From: "Jim Fenton" <[e-mail]>
> To: [e-mail]
> Sent: Wednesday, October 2, 2013 3:54:26 PM
> Subject: [dmarc-ietf] External review of draft-kucherawy-dmarc-base-01
> 
> I have not been monitoring this mailing list, but a couple of people
> have asked me to have a look at the DMARC spec.  I apologize for the
> amount of time it has taken for me to get to this.
> 
> I'll leave out the editorial issues, but I'm happy to share those (in
> particular, with the editors) if there is interest.  I'll start with a
> lot of specific comments; there are a few additional comments at the
> very end.
> 
> ===
> 
> 1. Introduction
> 
> Paragraph 3:  I'm surprised to see the use of the word "policy". In the
> context of ADSP (originally Sender Signing Policy), the word "policy"
> was considered inaccurate because it was deemed inappropriate to dictate
> policy to a Receiving Domain. Even though SSP was describing the
> domain's policy with respect to signing messages with DKIM, the word
> "practices" was substituted. Is it now considered acceptable to make
> policy requests of a Receiving Domain?

I guess yes, because the receiver is willing to mainly do as told....

> 
> Paragraph 4 #1: "assertions about senders' practices" : shouldn't that
> be Domain Owners' practices, since the sender might include spoofers?
> 
> Paragraph 3 #1: "Senders make policy assertions" -> "Domain owners
> publish policy assertions". But see comment below about "domain owners",
> and note that DMARC records contain considerably more than policy
> assertions.
> 
> Paragraph 3 #2-1: "The receiver" might be interpreted as being an MUA.
> Suggest "Receiving domains". "how the mail is handled" -> "how they
> should handle the mail"
> 
> Last bullet: I immediately went to the case of the From: header field
> with multiple addresses, which had been a significant issue with ADSP.
> More about this later.
> 
> 2.1 High-Level Goals
> 
> First bullet: senders -> Domain Owners. Similar comment on the word
> "receivers".
> 
> Third bullet: "effect on legitimate messages" isn't clear on what the
> "effect" is. Deliverability impact?
> 
> 2.4 Out of Scope
> 
> This section is full of double negatives, e.g., "not in scope for this
> work include: DMARC shall not be required..."
> 
> Authentication of individuals rather than domains: DMARC doesn't perform
> authentication at all, it acts on the result of two other mechanisms.
> This muddies that point.
> 
> 3. Terminology and Definitions
> 
> The main part of this section is indeed terminology and definitions, but
> the subsections, particularly 3.2, aren't.  This should be reorganized.
> 
> Domain Owner: This definition clearly defines the Domain Owner as the
> registrant of a domain. But as we will see much later, DMARC records are
> sometimes published by From domains directly, which could be a person or
> organization delegated by the Domain Owner. Perhaps another term is
> needed, because there are some things that are available only to Domain
> Owners and others that are also available to those able to publish a DNS
> record for a subdomain.

I feel a subdomain owner is still a domain owner

> 
> Organizational Domain: I have many problems with this:
> 
> (1) An algorithm like this doesn't belong in the definitions.
> (2) This creates a dependency on a public suffix list such as that
> published by Mozilla, but doesn't require the use of a particular list.
> This would create an inconsistency in the result of DMARC that I
> consider to be an interoperability problem.
> (3) During the development of ADSP, it was made clear to me by the DNS
> folks that there is no way, in practice, to determine an Organizational
> Domain.
> (4) The last paragraph acknowledges that it is a heuristic, and its use
> of "currently" implies that something better is in the works (which
> needs to be described instead in the spec).
> 
> 3.2 Overview
> 
> Paragraph 1: "Mail sent for such a domain" -> "Mail sent from such a
> domain" (important distinction!)
> 
> Paragraph 2: Feedback is to the Domain Owner, not the claimed sender.
> 
> Paragraph 4: "from the Domain Owner" -> "from the Organizational Domain"
> 
> [aside: I see, much later in the spec, that DMARC records can be
> published by the From domain directly, not just from the Domain Owner. A
> lot of earlier text needs to be cleaned up to accommodate that.]
> 
> 3.3 Flow Diagram
> 
> "The above diagram shows the flow of messages": But there are lots
> more.  Spoofed messages have a different flow. So do mailing lists,
> domains with multiple layers of MTAs, etc. This is just the simplest
> flow of legitimate messages.
> 
> Item 6: "author's DNS data".  For SPF and DKIM, what's queried is not
> necessarily the author domain.
> 
> Item 7: "queries to the author domain": Organizational Domain? (with the
> above aside as a caveat)
> 
> 3.4 Identifier Alignment
> 
> It would be good to start with a definition of what identifier alignment
> is, and I'm not finding that (perhaps it is buried there somewhere).
> 
> Paragraph 2 end: "most MUAs represent..." introduces a UI issue, and we
> have considered that out-of-bounds in the past.

Yes, but you should not ignore the reality of what most MUA's present to the end user.

> 
> Paragraph 4: identity alignment -> identifier alignment
> 
> This section should discuss the rare-but-legal case of From: header
> fields with multiple addresses.
> 
> 3.4.1 DKIM-authenticated identifiers
> 
> I got confused here right away by the use of "strict" and "relaxed"
> modes without proper introduction to what they are, since those terms
> are used in DKIM (as canonicalization modes) and mean something very
> different here. It was only when I got to the SPF section and it was
> still talking about strict and relaxed that I realized those terms were
> being used in DMARC as well.
> 
> Paragraph 2: must be equal -> must be equal in order to be considered to
> be in alignment
> 
> Last paragraph: "DMARC pass" hasn't been defined anywhere.  Does DMARC
> produce a pass/fail result?
> 
> 3.4.1 and 3.4.2
> 
> I'm unclear on the motivation for having both strict and relaxed modes.
> Is it because we don't know what will work in practice, or because
> different sorts of domains will want to choose differently. If the
> latter, please give some guidance for which mode should be used in which
> situation.

The financial industry indicated they wanted a strict method, tho I still have to see an example in the wild.
> 
> 4. Policy
> 
> Paragraph 2: sending domains -> Organizational Domains (with above caveat)
> 
> Paragraph 4: It's possible to determine non-use of SPF, but not DKIM, in
> this way.
> 
> 5. DMARC Policy Record
> 
> Paragraph 2: "matches perfectly with the DNS".  Not at all -- the fact
> that it isn't possible to deterministically determine the organizational
> domain, is an example of the mismatch.  Also, operational limits on DNS
> record sizes prompts the use of non obvious syntax like the !<size>
> construct.
> 
> 5.2 General Record Format
> 
> Paragraph 2: Last sentence is less about DMARC than about change control
> for the spec itself.
> 
> adkim tag: Definition unnecessarily limits alignment modes to "s" and
> "anything else". Suggest that it require "s" or "r", with other values
> reserved for future use.
> 
> fo: The tag value can contain both 0 and 1; what happens then?
> 
> d: Not sure why it's interesting to find about broken signatures when
> there's a good signature that meets alignment requirements.


dkim is hard to diagnose, and any information is useful

> 
> p: quarantine: What does "fails the DMARC mechanism" mean overall? Is
> this defined somewhere?  "suspicious": After all the controversy about
> the use of the use of the word suspicious in SSP/ADSP, I'm highly amused
> to see it here.
> 
> pct: DNS domain isn't defined. DMARC mechanism is to be applied -> DMARC
> policy is to be applied
> 
> rf: This is comma-separated, while other tag values are colon-separated.
> Why the inconsistency?
> Initial default values are -> Possible values are (and possibly
> reference a registry)
> [IODEF] is listed as an Informative Reference; shouldn't it be normative
> like [AFRF]?
> 
> ri: It seems like everything is best-effort; the Receiving Domain is
> doing a favor here (and sendto: is itself best effort).
> 
> sp: Does this apply to subdomains at all levels, or just direct
> subdomains? What's the motivation for specifying a different policy for
> subdomains vs. the organizational domain?  Should also point out that sp
> is meaningful only for DMARC records published in Organizational Domains
> and not From domains, (although  publishing in From domains isn't
> introduced until later in the document).
> 
> 6. Policy Enforcement Considerations
> 
> Paragraph 2: "...not to increase the likelihood of accepting abusive
> mail..." This seems like a qualitative requirement, not sure it belongs
> here.
> 
> 7.1 Verifying External Destinations
> 
> Paragraph 3: SHOULD -- shouldn't that be a MUST?
> 
> Item 8: If rua and ruf can be overridden by the report receiver,
> wouldn't it be useful to be able to override at least ri and perhaps
> other values as well?
> 
> Third to last paragraph: "*._report._dmarc.example.com" looks rather
> scary -- mechanisms that depend on DNS wildcarding are always fragile.
> This may very well work, but it looks to me like this record actually
> says that example.com is willing to receive reports for ANY domain, not
> just child domains.

yes it is needed for third party processors which may not know what they "customers" will throw at them. However they should know what they are doing when they wildcard.
> 
> 7.2 Aggregate reports
> 
> The format for these reports is critical to interoperability -- should
> it really be specified in an appendix?  It's more important to specify
> the format of the reports than the requirements shown in the bulleted list.
> 
> 7.3 Failure reports
> 
> Paragraph 1 reads as though AFRF is the only reporting format, but needs
> to accommodate IODEF and any future-defined reporting formats as well.
> For extensibility, there should also be a way for the Mail Receiver to
> generate a meta-report saying that they don't support the requested
> report format.
> 
> 7.3.1 Reporting Format Update
> 
> Are there any updates to IODEF?
> 
> 7.4 Failure Reports
> 
> Paragraph 2: "ruf" tag -> "rf" tag
> 
> 8. Policy Discovery
> 
> This is the first mention I have seen that DMARC records are published
> directly on From domains; up to this point it looked like DMARC was only
> published by a Domain Owner on an Administrative Domain.  This changes a
> lot -- like the fact that a delegate of the Domain Owner, and not the
> [administrative] Domain Owner him/herself, can set the policy for a
> domain. This might require a major change of terminology usage, or at
> least a change in the definition of Domain Owner, to fix.
> 
> Items 2 and 4: Effectively, this means that v=DMARC2 records are
> completely independent of v=DMARC1 records. There is no interoperability
> between versions. Is this what is intended?
> 
> "If the RFC5322.From domain does not exist...": This specifies an action
> that has nothing to do with DMARC. I don't know the history of this but
> it seems like if there was going to be some global "you SHOULD reject
> messages with a nonexistent From domain" action, it belongs someplace
> like RFC 5322, not here. See also comment under A.4.

this is specified in another RFC but MTA have been accepting malformed emails, it is a reminder that malformed emails should not be accepted for DMARC to work.

> 
> 9. Domain Owner Actions
> 
> Paragraph 1: "set up an address to receive reports" -- could also
> delegate that externally
> 
> Paragraph 2: What does "protect those email addresses" mean?
> 
> Paragraph 3: What does this have to do with domain owner actions? If
> this is connected to the previous paragraph, note that there is no
> requirement that reports use SPF and/or DKIM authentication (although
> perhaps there should be).
> 
> Paragraph 4: Need some specific guidance on how URIs other than mailto:
> are to be used (although there is some discussion of this in section 11;
> maybe a forward reference is needed)
> 
> 10.1 Extract Author Domain
> 
> Paragraph 3: "Such messages SHOULD be rejected." Again, this specifies
> an action on messages that has nothing to do with DMARC. In particular,
> bullet 2 and 4 describe messages that are legal according to RFC 5322,
> and if they're undesirable should have been addressed there.
> 
> If the messages are rejected, should they be silently discarded or fully
> rejected (per section 15.4)?
> 
> 10.3 Messaging Sampling
> 
> Much of this section applies generally to the application of policy and
> not specifically to sampling, so perhaps the section heading should be
> "Policy Application" or something like that.
> 
> 11.1 Discovery
> 
> Paragraph 1: Does not discuss DMARC policy records associated with
> Administrative Domains, only those associated with the From address
> (converse of everything before section 8).
> 
> Paragraph 2: Section 7.1 -> Section 8
> 
> 11.2 Transport
> 
> Paragraph 1: "secure transport mechanism" needs to be specified more
> completely. Does SMTP/TLS qualify? Is successful certificate
> verification required?
> 
> Paragraph 3: "Mail Receiver SHOULD send" -- section 11.2.4 (paragraph 1)
> says that an attempt MUST be made.
> 
> "MAY discard" -- 11.2.4 calls for error reports
> 
> 11.2.1 Email
> 
> Paragraph 1: Is it equally acceptable to send via SMTP over SSL (port 465)?
> 
> Filename extensions: Is the .gz format just a GZIPped XML file?  That
> isn't stated clearly, and if it is, why not make the extension .xml.gz?
> 
> 11.2.2 HTTP
> 
> Paragraph 2: "POST or PUT" -- which method is used? Must reporting URIs
> support both methods? Or is there a process for discovering which method
> is to be used?
> 
> I'm not an expert in HTTP, but I have the feeling that this transport
> (and all transports except possibly mailto:) is underspecified. For
> example, what Content-Types MUST be supported? Are there any other HTTP
> headers that MUST be included?
> 
> 11.2.4 Error Reports
> 
> Paragraph 1: Last sentence seems to say that mailto: URIs are preferred
> over other transports, which is the opposite of the last paragraph of
> section 9.
> 
> Why is the error report in a text/plain format rather than a text/xml
> format like the feedback reports themselves?
> 
> "Note: A more rigorous syntax specification...will be added here" says
> this is still an experimental capability.
> 
> 12. Capacity Planning
> 
> DNS: This understates the actual DNS load; there will be additional
> queries in connection with looking up and sending feedback and aggregate
> reports, additional queries associated with reporting addresses that are
> outside the current domain, and probably other things I haven't
> considered (like DNSSEC). A more thorough analysis is needed here.
> 
> 13. Minimum Implementations
> 
> Please provide separate minimum requirements for Domain Owners (or other
> publishers of DMARC records) and Mail Receivers. Bear in mind that
> Domain Owners, etc. may not themselves receive the reports.
> 
> 14. Privacy Considerations
> 
> One privacy consideration I don't see listed anywhere is forwarding
> privacy: Basic email provides good protection against message senders
> finding out the actual delivery address of forwarded mail. The reporting
> capabilities of DMARC make it trivially easy for a Domain Owner to
> discover the delivery address of a message delivered to a
> DMARC-compliant Receiving Domain.
> 
> 14.2 Report Recipients
> 
> It might be noted that the privacy consideration is not that different
> from a domain with an MX record that is handled by someone outside the
> domain.
> 
> 14.4 Secure Protocols
> 
> Should there be a requirement that if the original message was sent with
> TLS, that feedback reports be sent securely?

We should avoid to link too many things together...

> 
> 15.1 Use of RFC5322.From
> 
> Last paragraph: "This document prescribes no specific action, other
> than..."  Section 10.1 does indeed prescribe a specific action that
> SHOULD be taken.
> 
> 15.3 DNS Load and Caching
> 
> It would be good to see a more thorough analysis of DNS effects -- both
> the number of queries that DMARC adds and the possible use of DMARC
> records (large records, at well-known locations in DNS) for DNS
> amplification attacks.
> 
> 15.5 Identifier Alignment Considerations
> 
> Paragraph 1: Don't the concerns about SPF apply apply to DKIM key
> records too?
> 
> Paragraph 3: "cede" -> "delegate" (administrator doesn't actually lose
> control)
> 
> 16. IANA Considerations
> 
> I didn't review this section.
> 
> 17. Security Considerations
> 
> Check RFC 6376 Section 8.x for other attacks that might be documented
> here. In particular, attackers might publish intentionally malformed
> DMARC records in conjunction with domains they control and send mail
> from in an effort to make DMARC less useful or onerous in some way, in
> an effort to discourage its use.
> 
> 
> 17.2 DNS Security
> 
> This should emphasize that both the publication of DNSSEC by Domain
> Owners and the use of DNSSEC-aware resolvers by Mail Receivers is
> needed.  See also RFC 6376 section 8.5.
> 
> Appendix A. Technology Considerations
> 
> These provide good insight into some of the design choices made in the
> development of DMARC. Is the intent to include this in the
> standards-track document, or is this just information to aid the
> evaluation process?
> 
> A.3 Sender Header Field
> 
> Item 3: Note that there are already multiple ways to discover policy
> (From Domain and Owner Domain), but yes, this would add to the complexity.
> 
> A.4 Domain Existence Test
> 
> This section indicates that there was operational experience that the
> error rate was too high. Given that experience, I am surprised that
> section 8 says that the receiver SHOULD reject the message.
> 
> Note that while [ADSP] does discuss checks for domain existence, it is
> in connection with determining the ADSP result, not with rejection of
> the message.
> 
> A.5 Issues With ADSP In Operation
> 
> This section reads like somewhat of a debate with ADSP, or as though
> DMARC is competing with ADSP. DMARC and ADSP have different goals, and
> different constraints (e.g., SPF is explicitly out of scope of ADSP) so
> the list of issues doesn't really make sense.
> 
> A.6 Organizational Domain Discovery Issues
> 
> Paragraph 3: "Climbing the tree", explored extensively in the
> development of ADSP, can of course be constrained to a specific limited
> number of queries. But ultimately even a one-level climb was considered
> too much and was rejected. Nevertheless, DMARC does look for policy in
> two places (the From domain and the Organizational Domain).
> 
> The approach being used in DMARC was briefly considered in ADSP, but
> didn't even make it into a draft at the strong advice of the DNS
> Directorate that there is no way to reliably determine the delegation
> level in a domain name.
> 
> B. Examples
> 
> It looks like these examples are attempting to define the syntax of
> aspects of DMARC, rather than to be illustrative of things that are
> defined normatively elsewhere.  I have not otherwise reviewed this section
> 
> C. DMARC XML Schema
> 
> Not reviewed.
> 
> =====
> 
> General Comments
> 
> There is no discussion of the effect of the effect of DMARC on some very
> common situations, such as mailing lists and forwarding (except a couple
> of hints at heuristics in the XML Schema). If the deployment of DMARC
> has an effect on the delivery of messages sent through mailing lists,
> that's a serious problem. I'm not aware of a straightforward answer to
> that problem, other than to maintain a whitelist of mailing lists that
> themselves authenticate their messages, which would normally not align
> with the From addresses at all. This has been cited as a serious problem
> with ADSP, so one would not want to repeat that problem here.
> 

I think we will be working on that in the BCP. I'm not sure it has to be in the spec.