Re: [dmarc-ietf] Is From spoofing an interoperability issue or not?

Hector Santos <hsantos@isdg.net> Tue, 18 April 2023 21:19 UTC

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From: Hector Santos <hsantos@isdg.net>
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Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2023 17:19:06 -0400
Cc: IETF DMARC WG <dmarc@ietf.org>
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To: Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it>
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Is From spoofing an interoperability issue or not?
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On Apr 18, 2023, at 1:11 PM, Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it> wrote:
> 
> Perhaps when DMARC will work smoothly, someone will find out how to tell legitimate rewriting from plain spoof.
> 

Lookup DMARC record and begin to piggy back off this lookup:

- Check for rewrite=1 tag indicating allowance to rewrite. 

- Check for asl= or atps=y signer authorization.

If the domain tells the resigner he can destroy the authorship, you now have a legitimate protocol negotiated handshake/contract. I prefer if there was an explicit authorization using asl= or atps=y, but an open ended rewrite=1 tag is fine, I think.  It is permission the domain is giving to resigners.

—
HLS