[dmarc-ietf] Re: Assessing the connection between ARC and the malicious impersonation problem

Carlos Horowicz <carlos@planisys.com> Mon, 27 July 2026 10:02 UTC

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Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2026 12:02:47 +0200
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To: Douglas Foster <dougfoster.emailstandards@gmail.com>
References: <CALaySJJx_Q7ANbhooNSHY7XawW51Lt42hM771O6Kr-pKLrt5=g@mail.gmail.com> <CAJ4XoYc0DKpuT1ssSJDfPuGkPKNv=0Ex13mg68RhZ3rvZeeMCA@mail.gmail.com> <8662a47a-48da-4bb2-b783-ca2f4350a96b@tana.it> <CALaySJLJs==PKkb=J_=44jbime9c0npJfhwYFn-v22BXA2vgGQ@mail.gmail.com> <a3864c55-2a87-46a8-b8a6-a1a1d54f87f3@tana.it> <CAH48ZfxWEHRHTpGL_PoxQvtXkxXrxg7Q+Y7p-oYRVvXYWLQVrw@mail.gmail.com> <adf633b0-05a0-4320-8f2b-132f178b1258@app.fastmail.com> <8c22fde0-a244-4a3b-803f-6b33aca20f09@planisys.com> <CAH48ZfyZjSPuE_Mu0gzf9Ten1OTSQOxyBgnAuM_=ooobvxxHAQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Carlos Horowicz <carlos@planisys.com>
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Subject: [dmarc-ietf] Re: Assessing the connection between ARC and the malicious impersonation problem
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In our case I'm referring to originated mail, not forwarding/SPF upgrade 
scenarios.

Over roughly the last 12–18 months we've seen a noticeable change at 
OVH. More recently, a significant fraction of mail from OVH customers 
arrives through their centralized outbound SMTP infrastructure (e.g. 
|*.mo574.mail-out.ovh.net|), so it appears they are encouraging or 
enforcing the use of managed outbound relays.

Before that, however, we saw very large malware and phishing waves 
originating directly from customer VPSes (typically |vps-*.ovh.net|). 
Operationally, the Return-Path and visible From: covered a very wide 
variety of domains. I can't say what controls OVH applied at account 
creation or submission time, only that from the receiver's perspective 
these systems generated a substantial amount of abuse. Eventually we 
ended up scoring entire hosting ranges because individual IP reputation 
couldn't keep up with the churn.

We're a multi-tenant perimeter provider, and many of the organizations 
we protect still have relatively weak SPF/DMARC deployments. As a 
result, attacks using lookalike or impersonated From: addresses remain 
common in our environment, even if they don't always involve a strict 
RFC 5322.From / RFC 5321.MailFrom mismatch.

So my earlier comment was more about where the abuse originates (hosting 
providers and residential networks with open port 25) than about 
confirmed two-address impersonation specifically.

Separately, as a receiver and forwarding service, we've become 
increasingly interested in ARC because legitimate aliases and Sieve 
redirects can otherwise cause SPF/DMARC failures downstream, which in 
turn may negatively affect the reputation of forwarding MTAs. That's a 
different problem from the abuse originating on hosting providers, but 
it's one we've also encountered operationally.

Carlos Horowicz
Planisys

On 27/07/2026 01:08, Douglas Foster wrote:
> Are you saying that ovh and some others ensure a correct Mail From 
> address but allow arbitrary From addresses?  I expect most hosting 
> services to prevent that.   I also expect attackers to avoid 
> environments that require them to expose their identity.
>
> Are you seeing this on originated mail or is it SPF upgrade trickery 
> via forwarding though the hosting service?
>
>
> My 1000 to 1 estimate is based on several years experience requiring 
> SPF Pass or equivalent in local policy.  Only on the last 90 days have 
> I found a confirmed case of two address impersonation.  Once it was 
> confirmed, I created exceptions for acceptable ESPs and others, then 
> began requiring From authentication via DMARC or equivalent in local 
> policy.  The tighter block rule catches very little impersonation
>
> DF
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Jul 26, 2026, 5:42 PM Carlos Horowicz 
> <carlos=40planisys.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>     Hosting (in particular ovh) has been the biggest source of waves
>     of malicious email in the last 12-18 months ... not necessarily
>     bare metal
>
>     Residential FTTH-like services that have port 25 open are also a
>     huge source of spam, malware, etc
>
>     Last but not least, some sporadic malicious campaigns of mails
>     containing phishing+malware links via sendgrid ... these are very
>     expensive to detect
>
>     Carlos Horowicz
>     Planisys
>
>     On 26/07/2026 22:09, Bron Gondwana wrote:
>>     On Sat, Jul 25, 2026, at 13:07, Douglas Foster wrote:
>>>     Essentially all malicious impersonation come from clients of
>>>     bare-metal hosting services, when those hosting services do not
>>>     restrict outbound SMTP.
>>
>>     I'd be interested to know if other receivers agree that this is
>>     their main source of impersonated email in 2026.
>>
>>     Bron.
>>
>>     --
>>       Bron Gondwana, CEO, Fastmail Pty Ltd / Fastmail US LLC
>>     brong@fastmailteam.com
>>
>>
>>
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