Re: [dmarc-ietf] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-srose-dkim-ecc-00.txt

["John Levine" <[e-mail]>]

>If you believe sha256/rsa1024 are forever, there is no actual need for
>draft-srose-dkim-ecc-00.txt.  The problem is, this need may arrive at
>some time, and this time is hardly predictable. There is also possible
>there may be the need to roll back ECC and mark it as insecure at some
>point of time. So one would expect from the standard: ...

One can expect whatever one wants, but as should be self-evident to
anyone who's read RFC 6376, it's not going to happen.  As Murray
noted, signers put whatever signatures they want on the messages, and
verifiers accept whatever signatures they find acceptable.

If verifiers stop accepting signatures with a weak algorithm it'll be
because they stop accepting them, not because of a "this is a weak
signature" flag.  One of the things DCRUP may do is to recommend that
they stop accepting signatures with SHA-1 hashes or 512 bit RSA keys.

R's,
John