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Re: [dns-privacy] Intermediate proposal (what I was saying at the mic)

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Mon, 02 August 2021 13:11 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 02 Aug 2021 06:10:39 -0700
Message-ID: <CABcZeBM+rBLgUs+xzyhTOjCFuPdjUDPDMeFL6CAXanDaicC+Pg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
Cc: DNS Privacy Working Group <dns-privacy@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] Intermediate proposal (what I was saying at the mic)
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On Sun, Aug 1, 2021 at 9:22 PM Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:

> On Fri, Jul 30, 2021, at 06:08, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > - Recursives can attempt to connect to any authoritative by probing
> >   with DoT/DoQ [0]. In this case, they should cleanly fall back to
> >   Do53 on connect failure and not validate the credential (whether
> >   WebPKI or DANE) This allows authoritatives to just turn on TLS
> >   without risk.
>
> I assume that your MUST NOT validate here only exists because of the
> combination of:
>
> 1.  Us not being able to decide between Web PKI and DANE; and
>

Largely, though it also allows for incremental rollout and a new auth
mechanism.

2.  The potential for an unauthenticated mode.
>
> If we decided on a single answer for the first and in the negative for the
> second, would that make authentication viable?  Or is the opportunism a
> feature?
>
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