Re: [dns-privacy] Direction of draft-mayrhofer-edns0-padding

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Wed, 29 July 2015 18:06 UTC

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Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 19:06:14 +0100
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Cc: Alexander Mayrhofer <alexander.mayrhofer@nic.at>, "dns-privacy@ietf.org" <dns-privacy@ietf.org>, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] Direction of draft-mayrhofer-edns0-padding
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On 29/07/15 19:00, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> On 29 Jul 2015, at 10:48, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> 
>>> Basically, the DNS stack will not know whether or not it is running
>>> under TLS/DTLS when the query and reply are formed; TLS/DTLS will be
>>> opportunistic. So, to be safe, the DNS client or server will be forced
>>> to add padding even when it is not needed, and thus make every message
>>> longer.
>>
>> I don't get that. Surely at most 1 query or response will be sent
>> when in such a state of ignorance, after which the application layer
>> can easily know if a TLS session exists. We are after all still
>> talking about stub<->recursive still, right?
> 
> We are not defining an API, so there is no way for the application layer
> to know what it is running under.

Eh? There may be some implementations like that but I'd be very
surprised if, when dprive is done, most implementations don't have
an is_doing_dprive() call they can make use of in application
layer code.

Sure if you're running over IPsec that's a problem, but it hasn't
been for TLS consuming applications that I know.

> 
>>
>>> We don't know how much padding is required to prevent analysis for
>>> particular query/response pairs, and thus need to add lots of
>>> random-length padding to each message to prevent the analysis.
>>
>> I also don't get that. I agree we're not sure how to best use
>> padding. But we can define the simple bit of protocol needed now
>> and then after folks figure out how best to use it we could have
>> some more recommendations to make. And those might end up being
>> context dependent. So I see no need to mandate something wasteful
>> now.
> 
> That would be fine. What I worry about is that people will say "we can
> pad; people tell us to pad liberally; we will pad liberally". It would
> be great for the spec to say "probably don't do this much until more
> research has been done".

That'd be fine if we can't do better by the time we're publishing
that RFC text, yes.

S.


> 
> --Paul Hoffman
> 
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