Re: forgery-resilience recommendations section

[JINMEI Tatuya / 神明達哉 <[e-mail]>]

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At Fri, 17 Aug 2007 00:06:24 -0400,
Edward Lewis <[e-mail]> wrote:

> So, let me propose that we document that there is a need for more 
> bits of unpredictability based on the calculations already in the 
> draft.  An open question to me is to specify a number, I mean, others 
> will have a far better idea than I so I won't suggest a number and 
> will go along with any consensus.  As far as how the "extended 
> unpredictability" is implemented is probably left best to the code 
> writers with maybe some hints in the document - but let's avoid 
> ratholing on anything that isn't needed for interoperability.

I agree on this point.  It sounds too much to me for a protocol
specification to specify a countermeasure that is pretty
implementation-dependent, especially with an RFC2119 keyword,
such as this one:

   Implementations SHOULD be configurable to use one or multiple ports
   for queries.

					JINMEI, Tatuya
					Communication Platform Lab.
					Corporate R&D Center, Toshiba Corp.
					[e-mail]


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