Re: [DNSOP] Fwd: HTTPSSVC record draft

神明達哉 <jinmei@wide.ad.jp> Fri, 26 July 2019 18:51 UTC

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From: 神明達哉 <jinmei@wide.ad.jp>
Date: Fri, 26 Jul 2019 11:51:39 -0700
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To: Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@pletterpet.nl>
Cc: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Fwd: HTTPSSVC record draft
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At Tue, 23 Jul 2019 17:04:43 +0200,
Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@pletterpet.nl> wrote:

> But as soon as clients start querying for ANAME (and not address
> records) meaning it will chase the target itself, the DNS server
> actually does not have to do a target lookup anymore.

True, but my understanding is that the key difference is that the web
browser community (at least some big players of it) is willing to
support HTTPSSVC, thereby already overcoming the most difficult part
of the chicken-and-egg problem: how to deploy it in the client side.
I actually don't fully understand how HTTPSSVC has got the support
while ANAME hasn't though (perhaps because of the incentive of other
HTTPSSVC features like the alternative service form?).

Once a sufficient number of clients support it, the authoritative side
will have the incentive of deploying HTTPSSVC, and if it's
sufficiently deployed in the authoritative side, too, then we can
eventually hope to deprecate the practice of CNAME at apex.

Right now, I'm not sure how we can expect this to happen for ANAME
(except by waiting for perhaps several decades, until almost all
recursive servers natively support ANAME).

--
JINMEI, Tatuya