Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC in draft-ietf-dnsop-resolver-priming

"Paul Hoffman" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Sat, 23 January 2016 20:47 UTC

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From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
To: "Wessels, Duane" <dwessels@verisign.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 2016 12:47:27 -0800
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC in draft-ietf-dnsop-resolver-priming
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On 22 Jan 2016, at 14:44, Wessels, Duane wrote:

> I think I'm okay with "resolvers SHOULD send DO when priming."  Seems 
> like BIND and Unbound already do this.

Noted. Waiting to hear from a bunch more people on this.

> Do we also need to say that the resolver SHOULD/MUST retry with DO=0 
> if there is no response to the first priming query?

Personal opinion: yes for SHOULD, but we need to integrate it with the 
earlier text about going to a different server if you don't get a 
response within 2 seconds.

> The more important question may be: what shall the resolver do if 
> validation of the priming response fails? I'm skeptical that we, as a 
> group, will be willing to say that the resolver should refuse to 
> forward any queries to a root unless validation succeeds.

Personal opinion: agree. We can say that it is local policy. One 
possible policy is to keep trying other hints until one response 
validates.

--Paul Hoffman