Re: [DNSOP] Verifying TLD operator authorisation

Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> Fri, 14 June 2019 13:23 UTC

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From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
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Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 14:23:43 +0100
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Verifying TLD operator authorisation
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> On 14 Jun 2019, at 14:13, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.NA> wrote:
> 
> Would (GPG encrypted) email to the registered address to the authority
> not be sufficient?  That would make sure the recipient is authorized and
> must then cause the token to be 'delegated' as the second factor.

If there was a secure* channel between the TLD registry and IANA like the GPG email you suggested, there wouldn’t really be a need to insert and check for some token in the TLD zone. Though as you say, that measure might be a useful way of adding 2FA.

* For some definition of secure.

In any case, I’m not sure this list is the right place to define or develop a solution for this issue. We probably don’t have a complete understanding of the problem space or the details of how IANA and TLD registries/SOs communicate with each other, what the requirements are, etc, etc.