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Re: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-httpssvc-02.txt

Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> Tue, 10 March 2020 18:54 UTC

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From: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
To: Patrick McManus <mcmanus@ducksong.com>
Cc: Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org>, Patrick McManus <mcmanus@ducksong.com>, Ben Schwartz <bemasc=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2020 18:54:29 +0000
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-httpssvc-02.txt
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On Tuesday, 10 March 2020 18:25:57 UTC Patrick McManus wrote:
> alt-svc is quite robust to reachability failures of the alternative origins
> should some client find itself on a network that filters full transit.
> 
> This process is already existing technology (rfc 7838). From that
> perspective the DNS record is just a way to bootstrap it over DNS rather
> than the default host/port for the URI.

your reply makes it seem that i've stepped into a Narrative. nothing in rfc 
7838 describes a risk reduction against the httpssvc "port" parameter leading 
a service operator to put something on an "alternative origin" whose port 
number will be broadly unrecognized by far end managed private networks, which 
would prevent flow-state creation, thus creating black holes. httpssvc is not 
an alternate service description permitting fallback to the non-alternative; 
httpssvc is the service description itself. any non-default port used there 
will have reachability that is exactly proportional to locality.

-- 
Paul

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