Re: [DNSOP] New Version Notification for draft-wessels-dns-zone-digest-01.txt

George Michaelson <ggm@algebras.org> Mon, 09 July 2018 23:36 UTC

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From: George Michaelson <ggm@algebras.org>
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 09:36:34 +1000
Message-ID: <CAKr6gn1ALiKPXPpi6ggwiFeLMH-b15UjfWOnMY2++SyoXoiQpQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Wessels, Duane" <dwessels@verisign.com>
Cc: dnsop WG <dnsop@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] New Version Notification for draft-wessels-dns-zone-digest-01.txt
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There's arguments both sides about cross signing, counter signing and
independent self-signing. If you want to promote out of band zone
exchange, it has to be signed. The key it signs with is immaterial if
you either direct knowledge of the PK in a PKI, or accept a trust
anchor relationship over it, or a web of trust.

So do you prefer (for instance) that the ZSK be used outside of DNSSEC
to sign a detached signature over the file, irrespective or content
order, if the file is to be made available? Because if you basically
prefer its *not signed* for this mode of transfer, you've stepped
outside the model: you now demand the file is checked on load, element
by element, against the TA, rather than being integrity checked by a
MAC signed by the issuer, which permits eg direct binary loadable, or
other states.

-G

On Tue, Jul 10, 2018 at 7:47 AM, Wessels, Duane <dwessels@verisign.com> wrote:
>
>> On Jul 8, 2018, at 6:02 PM, George Michaelson <ggm@algebras.org> wrote:
>>
>> So how about use of a PGP key which is a payload in TXT signed over by
>> the ZSK/KSK so the trust paths bind together?
>>
>> fetch one DNS record +sigs, check against the TA (which has to be a
>> given) and then..
>
> Currently in the zone digest draft DNSSEC is not mandatory.  That is, the zone
> needn't necessarily be signed and a receiver need not perform the validation if
> they don't want to.
>
> Even without DNSSEC the digest gives you a little protection from accidental corruption.  But not from malicious interference of course.
>
> It seems kind of silly to me to double up on public key cryptosystems.  We already have keys attached to zones and software that generates and validates signatures.
>
> DW
>