Re: [DNSOP] Alvaro Retana's No Objection on draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec3-guidance-08: (with COMMENT)

Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net> Tue, 24 May 2022 16:33 UTC

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From: Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net>
To: Alvaro Retana via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org>
Cc: "The IESG" <iesg@ietf.org>, Alvaro Retana <aretana.ietf@gmail.com>, draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec3-guidance@ietf.org, dnsop-chairs@ietf.org, dnsop@ietf.org, tjw.ietf@gmail.com
References: <165219706078.31003.2473140903964739813@ietfa.amsl.com>
Date: Tue, 24 May 2022 09:32:48 -0700
In-Reply-To: <165219706078.31003.2473140903964739813@ietfa.amsl.com> (Alvaro Retana via Datatracker's message of "Tue, 10 May 2022 08:37:40 -0700")
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Alvaro Retana's No Objection on draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec3-guidance-08: (with COMMENT)
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Alvaro Retana via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> writes:

> Should this document formally Update RFC5155?  Besides providing "guidance on
> setting NSEC3 parameters", there is also Normative language that seems similar
> to what is in rfc5155, but not the same.  For example:
> 
> In §3.2 this document says:
> 
>    Validating resolvers MAY return an insecure response to their clients
>    when processing NSEC3 records with iterations larger than 0.  Note
>    also that a validating resolver returning an insecure response MUST
>    still validate the signature over the NSEC3 record to ensure the
>    iteration count was not altered since record publication (see
>    [RFC5155] section 10.3).
> 
> I couldn't find text in rfc5155 about how returning insecure responses is
> optional, but I did find this in §10.3 that seems related to the validation
> requirement:
> 
>    A resolver MAY treat a response with a higher value as insecure,
>    after the validator has verified that the signature over the NSEC3
>    RR is correct.
> 
> Reading further, §3.2 does say that "this specification updates [RFC5155]", but
> there's no indication in the header or anywhere else.

As discussed in other threads, the replacement version will update 5155.

And yes, I agree that the returning of insecure for large values is not
spelled out in a really strong way (and is one of the reasons I think
the DNSOP WG thinks our document is a good update as we specify this
with greater clarity).
-- 
Wes Hardaker
USC/ISI