Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Re: Comments on draft-wessels-dns-zone-digest-02

"John Levine" <johnl@taugh.com> Fri, 10 August 2018 22:06 UTC

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Date: Fri, 10 Aug 2018 18:06:05 -0400
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From: John Levine <johnl@taugh.com>
To: dnsop@ietf.org
Cc: edward.lewis@icann.org
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Re: Comments on draft-wessels-dns-zone-digest-02
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In article <2204181E-9433-4B93-B240-92FF754A2468@icann.org> you write:
>How realistic is it that a forged zone could defeat all of the channel security for a zone?  How likely would it be for
>someone to load a false zone on all the places a recursive server would look for it?  Answering that would be a crucial step
>in deciding whether to add a zone hash mechanism.

Since the obvious use case for this is to enable zone distribution
over insecure channels, such as FTP or bittorrent, I'd say it's
completely realistic.

R's,
John