Re: [DNSOP] Why ZSK rollover is a Bad Idea (tm)
Todd Glassey <tglassey@earthlink.net> Thu, 08 October 2009 17:37 UTC
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Date: Thu, 08 Oct 2009 10:39:24 -0700
From: Todd Glassey <tglassey@earthlink.net>
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To: Doug Barton <dougb@dougbarton.us>
References: <1C586E51-D77C-406C-9B89-47276A9B41B2@ICSI.Berkeley.EDU> <p06240812c6f160ac1fb2@10.20.30.158> <d3aa5d00910061408y191bf863p48a6ec703553b67e@mail.gmail.com> <FB20C78E-3A72-409C-8406-2B8A00923783@NLnetLabs.nl> <712BBDEE-25FF-4E2E-A9E5-49E49162D41D@hopcount.ca> <005603A4-31C0-49E0-894F-3FAEB38D7D92@dnss.ec> <4ACD8333.7050806@dougbarton.us>
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Cc: dnsop WG <dnsop@ietf.org>, Roy Arends <roy@dnss.ec>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Why ZSK rollover is a Bad Idea (tm)
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Doug Barton wrote: > Roy Arends wrote: > >> I find it worrying that folks intend to test or practice operational >> procedures by doing it often on a live production system. What if that >> test or practice fails? "Whoops, we were testing it on the live system, >> we failed, good thing we called it a test" >> >> There is also a risk involved by rolling keys over regularly. Especially >> when the schedule is publicly announced. "If your attack fails, we will >> have write access to the keystore _every month_, on the 1st, at exactly >> 3 am cest". >> >> I fail to see the operational benefit of "Frequent Rollover Syndrome". >> > > Roy, > > I know you understand the concept that no matter how well you practice > something in the QA lab you're never really _sure_ it works till you > do it "in the wild." I think that at least in the early days of actual > DNSSEC deployment (which we have barely stepped into atm) it's very > reasonable to exercise all parts of the system now, under (relatively) > controlled conditions so that down the road if we reach a point where > we are forced to do an emergency key rollover on an "important" zone > we'll have some level of comfort (or at least know where to look for > things to break). > > Down the road I tend to agree with you that "frequent" KSK rollover > will probably not have much benefit, but if I were administering a > zone for which DNSSEC was critical I'd probably do it once a year just > to keep all parts of the machine lubricated. > Doug - the key changes will want to be in accordance with corporate policy for all identity token management and should be administered as such. That generally means in audited company's a formal review once a year or more often. Because of this and since the DNSSEC services will become a key part of Internet presence management, these will also need to be reviewed as part of any formal IT audit practice as well. Todd Glassey (as an Auditor). > > Doug > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > No virus found in this incoming message. > Checked by AVG - www.avg.com > Version: 8.5.421 / Virus Database: 270.14.7/2421 - Release Date: 10/07/09 20:49:00 > >
- Re: [DNSOP] [dnsext] Why ZSK rollover is a Bad Id… Olaf Kolkman
- Re: [DNSOP] [dnsext] Why ZSK rollover is a Bad Id… Olaf Kolkman
- Re: [DNSOP] Why ZSK rollover is a Bad Idea (tm) Chris Thompson
- Re: [DNSOP] [dnsext] Why ZSK rollover is a Bad Id… Joe Abley
- Re: [DNSOP] [dnsext] Why ZSK rollover is a Bad Id… Thierry Moreau
- Re: [DNSOP] [dnsext] Why ZSK rollover is a Bad Id… Roy Arends
- Re: [DNSOP] [dnsext] Why ZSK rollover is a Bad Id… Joe Abley
- Re: [DNSOP] [dnsext] Why ZSK rollover is a Bad Id… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [DNSOP] [dnsext] Why ZSK rollover is a Bad Id… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [DNSOP] [dnsext] Why ZSK rollover is a Bad Id… Joe Abley
- Re: [DNSOP] Why ZSK rollover is a Bad Idea (tm) Doug Barton
- Re: [DNSOP] [dnsext] Why ZSK rollover is a Bad Id… Olaf Kolkman
- Re: [DNSOP] Why ZSK rollover is a Bad Idea (tm) Todd Glassey