Re: [DNSOP] Another suggestion for "any"

Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> Wed, 11 March 2015 16:48 UTC

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Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 12:48:00 -0400
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Another suggestion for "any"
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On Tue, Mar 10, 2015 at 08:13:04PM -0700, Brian Dickson wrote:
> 
> Okay, thinking about this a bit more...
> Recursive vs authoritative, RD=0 vs RD=1.
> 
> In all combinations of the above, do the "new thing", except for one corner
> case:
> if(RD==1 && I_AM_AUTHORITY) then
>   do_ANY
> 
> (Which happens to be the default if someone uses "dig" against an auth
> server).

Which means that authoritative servers who were _already_ seeing abuse
with RD=1 and ANY would be told they have to reply to them; but some
operators of authoritative servers have been dropping those on the
floor for some time on the principle that you shouldn't be asking an
authoritative server with the RD bit set.

Either ANY is something we think needs support or it is not.  If we
think it's really not something that needs support, then we should say
so and be done with it.

In any case, I don't like all this conditional logic around ANY.  It
seems to me likely to make code bases brittle and hard to change, new
implementations to be hard to get right, and to make operations
troubleshooting much harder because you have to cover more cases.

Best regards,

A
-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@anvilwalrusden.com