Re: [DNSOP] New Version Notification for draft-jabley-dnsop-refuse-any-00.txt

Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> Thu, 01 October 2015 14:33 UTC

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Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 07:33:10 -0700
From: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
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To: Shane Kerr <shane@time-travellers.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] New Version Notification for draft-jabley-dnsop-refuse-any-00.txt
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Shane Kerr wrote:
>
>
> In the case where people just want to reduce the damage of ANY queries
> in reflection attacks, I quite like the PowerDNS option of forcing ANY
> queries to TCP via truncation. I'm not sure if this has been documented
> in any RFC, but if not then perhaps it bears mentioning too?

note that in a normal reflective ddos where a lot of ANY queries are
being received, the above proposal results in a full TCP session table,
thus denying TCP service to any non-attacker.

this is not a serious problem since virtually anyone can launch a denial
of service against TCP/53, without a distributed attack force. so, that
problem already exists.

if it's going to become a documented operational practice, then this
risk should be documented also.

-- 
Paul Vixie