Re: [Doh] Suggestion: The final endpoint should be able to temporarly act as a recursive DoH resolver
Ulrich Wisser <ulrich@wisser.se> Wed, 24 October 2018 09:54 UTC
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From: Ulrich Wisser <ulrich@wisser.se>
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2018 11:53:57 +0200
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To: Sebastian Nielsen <sebastian=40sebbe.eu@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Doh] Suggestion: The final endpoint should be able to temporarly act as a recursive DoH resolver
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I can see the reason behind this but would like to point out a few details. - clients would have to do dnssec validation - servers would need to not only provide answers to queries, but also the dnssec chain for the validation - what should happen with not dnssec signed answers? Dropped? How will the client get an answer in that case? Additionally, I think it should be made clearer that an endpoint should only answer for a known list of domains, as to not get abused by clients. - what should a server do if a not dnssec signed domain is configured in it's list? /Ulrich Sebastian Nielsen <sebastian=40sebbe.eu@dmarc.ietf.org> schrieb am Mi., 24. Okt. 2018 um 11:38 Uhr: > I have a suggestion for extending the DoH specification: > > > > The final endpoint, should be able to act as a authorative and sometimes > recursive DoH resolver if it has support for the DoH protocol, during the > normal HTTPS connection. > > > > This could mean that once you reach a WWW server, theres no need for > looking up domains like static.example.org and such since the result of > such domains could be returned by the original HTTPS server over the same > connection as the website traffic goes over. > > If the HTTPS server has other domains for example > ads.thirdparty-example.org as links it could return those aswell but only > if they are DNSSEC signed, and for security, a DoH client should only > accept results for a third-party domain if the result is DNSSEC signed. > > > > To avoid abuse, a WWW server supporting this extension should only allow > queries for its own domain and subdomains, and also queries for any > resources it has been configured to resolve (and this type of configuration > could be done automatically by for example a script on the web server that > adds all external links to its ACL) > > > > This would mean an WWW server serving content for itself and also have > links to ads.thirdparty-example.org could have those 2 domains cached in > its internal DoH resolver and resolve for those, thus once you reach a > webpage’s server, you no longer need to talk to your recursive DoH serverl, > which also increases privacy. > > > > This could lead to much faster response times aswell, as the WWW server > would have the information about all its linked hosts permanently cached > and updated regularly. > > Think like OCSP stapling but for DNS responses instead. > > > > > > Best regard, Sebastian Nielsen > _______________________________________________ > Doh mailing list > Doh@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/doh > -- Ulrich Wisser ulrich@wisser.se
- [Doh] Suggestion: The final endpoint should be ab… Sebastian Nielsen
- Re: [Doh] Suggestion: The final endpoint should b… Ulrich Wisser
- Re: [Doh] Suggestion: The final endpoint should b… Sebastian Nielsen
- Re: [Doh] Suggestion: The final endpoint should b… Ben Schwartz
- Re: [Doh] Suggestion: The final endpoint should b… Dave Lawrence