Re: [Doh] [Ext] DOH bypassing protection mechanisms

Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> Mon, 06 November 2017 06:16 UTC

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To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org>
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From: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
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Date: Mon, 06 Nov 2017 00:16:39 -0600
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Subject: Re: [Doh] [Ext] DOH bypassing protection mechanisms
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On 11/5/17 13:58, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> On Nov 5, 2017, at 11:48 AM, Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> wrote:
>>> It sounds like the operational document might say something like "an enterprise that cares about which DNS resolver its users access needs to also make that policy in DOH-enabled web clients".
>> s/web clients/DNS clients/, right?
> Maybe?
>
>> I don't get the impression that the use cases are intended to be restricted to web browsers as clients.
> They are not restricted to web clients (I was careful not to say "browsers"), but I don't expect current DNS clients to add DOH capabilities any time in the near future. We have had approximately zero success in getting stub resolvers deployed with DNS-over-TLS (RFC 7858), and getting them to do that would be easier than DNS-encoded-in-HTTP-over-TLS. DNS clients are a use case listed in Section 3 of the draft, but not one that we've heard much interest in.

Right. And if we're talking about text that we're planning to add to 
documents that will be published as RFCs, I think we'd want them to be 
valid for a pretty long period of time, rather than just for "the near 
future."

/a